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Reactions & Debate
Prophylactic Neutrality, Oppression, and the Reverse Pascal’s Wager
Simon Clarke – Independent Scholar
I. IntroductIon
Neutralism holds that government should not base its laws or policies on any particu-
lar view about how people should live; it should provide a neutral framework of rules 
within which people may pursue whatever views of the good life they wish, regardless 
of the plausibility or soundness of those views. Perfectionism rejects this, holding that 
it is permissible for government to act on the basis of conceptions of the good; govern-
ment action should be guided by worthwhile conceptions of the good life. The debate 
between these two views has practical implications. Some criminal prohibitions such as 
laws against drugs, gambling, prostitution, pornography, and homosexuality are called 
into question. While it may be possible to give these laws some neutral justification, at 
least part of their rationale seems to be that the activities themselves are intrinsically 
worthless or of little value. If so, then neutralism would hold that those laws are illegiti-
mate. State-funding decisions would also be affected. For example, neutralism may rule 
out state funding of the arts and rule out favouring classics of literature in public libraries, 
unless some neutral justification can be given for such actions.
Beyond Neutrality by George Sher considers and rejects a number of justifications for 
neutralism and sets out a perfectionist theory. Of the justifications for neutrality that Sher 
criticises, one deserves further scrutiny. The fifth chapter of Beyond Neutrality examines 
the idea that neutrality is a protective device against government oppression. Modern 
states have vast amounts of power, Sher writes: “To keep order, to protect citizens from 
external threats and from each other, and to provide essential services and public goods, 
a government must have both a (near-)monopoly on force and access to great wealth” 
(1997, 106). The fear that states may use this power to oppress people is one that is or 
has been borne out in many countries. Might perfectionism sanction oppression? One 
of the most prominent defenders of neutralism, John Rawls, suggested that the shared 
beliefs required by a perfectionist state “can be maintained only by the oppressive use of 
state power” (1993, 37). Other writers have raised this possibility (e.g. Quong 2011, 35), 
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but it is not usually thought a significant justification for neutrality, so Sher’s discussion 
is pioneering in that respect. Because it limits the reasons for which government may act, 
neutralism may be a way of containing the state’s power and thereby making oppression 
less likely. It would not guarantee the absence of oppression, for as Sher notes it is still 
possible that in a neutral state, “a government that does not oppress in the name of virtue 
or true religion may still do so in the name of prosperity or state security (or, for that mat-
ter, under no justificatory cover at all)” (1997, 109). Neutralism would make oppression 
less likely, however, because it removes one source of motivation for oppressive policies. 
It is a restriction on reasons for state action; with fewer reasons to act, there would be 
fewer reasons to act oppressively. The present contribution examines this view, which 
Sher calls ‘prophylactic neutrality’, in more detail. The first section sets out Sher’s criti-
cisms of the view and responds to them. The second section fleshes out in more detail 
the worry that abandoning neutralism could result in oppressive government and makes 
a case for prophylactic neutrality.
II. sher’s crItIque of prophylactIc neutralIty
Sher’s main criticism of prophylactic neutrality is that it is not the only way of reduc-
ing the likelihood of oppression. Alternatively,, a society could give citizens legal rights 
against their government, dispersing power, but without being neutralist. If so then 
“given a suitably potent array of legal rights, citizens have no need for any further 
protection. Because their rights already block the most dangerous abuses of power, 
they stand to gain little from the additional security of a neutral state. Thus, as long as 
governments recognize and enforce a suitable complement of rights, they can try to 
promote the good without raising the specter of oppression” (Sher 1997, 110). Sher 
concedes, however, that this criticism is open to the rejoinder that legal rights, rather 
than being an alternative to neutralism, themselves embody a way of implementing the 
neutrality constraint. If so, “when rights protect citizens from oppression, they do so 
precisely by making the state neutral” (1997, 110; italics original). Rights exist, so the 
rejoinder suggests, to prevent government from acting on ideals of the good life. Rights 
to freedom of thought and expression, for example, prevent the state from censoring 
material that expresses ideals of the good, ways of life, or religious doctrines that it does 
not like.
In response to this, Sher tries to show that liberal rights do not bring about neutral-
ity because it is quite possible for a society to be perfectionist even though citizens have 
legal rights. He points to current arrangements in the US where there is state-funding 
of the arts, environmental protection laws, and regulation of public obscenity, all in the 
name of promoting ideals of the good; while at the same time, the US is a society where 
citizens have legal rights against government. This, says Sher, shows that having legal 
rights does not implement neutrality; since “nonneutral laws and policies do coexist with 
our current rights, then we obviously can have adequate protection without having a 
neutral state” (1997, 112; italics original).
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But this is a mistaken conclusion. It is true that in the US individuals have legal 
rights against government while at the same time also having some perfectionist policies 
(and the same could be said about other countries in Europe and in Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand), but this does not prove the point. For it could be the case that these 
legal rights embody a sphere of neutrality while leaving room for perfectionist policies 
outside that sphere. The view I have in mind here is the kind defended by John Rawls and 
Brian Barry, where neutrality is a requirement for some central core of government deci-
sions, but government may permissibly act on perfectionist reasons for decisions outside 
this core. Rawls’ view is that neutrality is required with respect to “constitutional essen-
tials and matters of basic justice” but does not apply to “many economic and social issues 
that legislative bodies must regularly consider” (1994, 230; see also 214-215). Similarly, 
Barry’s view is that neutrality applies only to some but not all political decisions (although 
he thinks a different type of neutrality applies to the others), advocating constitutional 
as opposed to legislative neutrality (1995, 161). According to this view, for example, 
government must not favour one religion over others, say by making it the state religion 
that all government ministers must adhere to and that is taught in public schools; but it 
would be permissible, however, for government to permit nativity scenes to be displayed 
in town squares (provided such decisions are arrived at by democratic decision-making). 
What precisely is meant by “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice” is not 
clear. One way of making the distinction (though it is not Rawls’ or Barry’s) is in terms of 
coercive versus non-coercive government actions. The insistence could be on the state 
being neutral in its coercive measures but not in its non-coercive policies; it could have 
state-funding of the arts but not be permitted to force anyone into art-appreciation.1
Let us assume that there is some way of making the distinction and use the expres-
sion ‘core neutrality’ to refer to the idea that the state must be neutral with regard to 
some core of its arrangements (such as its constitutional essentials or its coercive meas-
ures), but that permits perfectionism in periphery decisions. Contrary to Sher’s argument, 
countries whose governments have perfectionist policies but also protect legal rights do 
not defeat prophylactic neutrality because those countries may be perfectionist but only 
at the periphery, while being neutral at their core. Sher’s idea is that societies that are 
perfectionist, but also have legal rights, demonastrate that it is possible to do without 
neutrality and still avoid oppression. Nevertheless, it might be the case that the neutrality 
constraint is working in the background as the rationale for legal rights while govern-
ment acts on perfectionist considerations in ways that do not violate legal rights. Perhaps 
neutralism is providing the framework of rights that protect people from oppression and 
that within this framework there is room for perfectionist policies.
A similar point applies to another argument that Sher makes. He considers 
neutralism as a modus vivendi among people with competing conceptions of the good; 
without it, so this justification for neutralism goes, there would be conflict, animosity, 
and bitterness. Against this, Sher argues that the effects of perfectionism are not that 
severe because there are stabilizing forces such as the liberalism of a tolerant mind-set. 
But then Sher considers the response: might this mind-set itself be rooted in neutrality? 
Sher argues that those attitudes have flourished in non-neutral societies (1997, 119-20). 
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Nonetheless, our response should be as before; the fact that liberal toleration occurs in 
non-neutral societies does not mean that it is not itself derived from a belief in neutrality, 
since societies are a mixture of neutrality and nonneutrality.
Is this reply a problem for perfectionists like Sher? Perhaps not, if all they want 
from a perfectionist theory is perfectionist policies outside the core. But they would have 
failed to refute prophylactic neutrality. The core of government in this view is neutral and 
neutrality is what provides protection against oppression. The worry remains that a more 
thorough-going perfectionism may be oppressive; if perfectionist reasons were permitted 
to guide core decisions the result could be oppression.
III. perfectIonIsm and oppressIon
To fully decide the matter we need to look at whether a perfectionist state can avoid 
oppression or will instead sanction it. Why is it thought that the result of state action 
guided by perfectionist reasons could be oppression? First let me start with a seemingly 
innocuous point: leading a life that is good is important. We want our lives to be good; 
it would be a bad thing if we were living our lives spent in trivial, pointless, worthless 
activities. This, however, has significant consequences because it is possible that leading 
a life that is good might be so important that it outweighs other considerations, such as 
letting people choose for themselves. Some examples will illustrate this general point. 
Imagine that it turns out to be true that God exists and that God requires a certain type of 
worship. From a perfectionist point of view it would seem fairly important that 
people lead their lives according to this fact; that any life that does not comply with it 
is an impaired one, bad for the person who lives it. If people are not attending religious 
services as they ought, then a perfectionist government should force them. Consider 
next ideals of sexuality. In some views, the most worthwhile form of sex, the one that is 
most intrinsically valuable, is that which is aimed at reproduction. Perhaps this should be 
accompanied by loving respect for one’s sexual partner and a commitment to that person 
(and to raise any offspring that may result), but loving respect and commitment in sexual 
activity alone are not worthwhile; they are valuable, according to the view being consid-
ered, only when they accompany reproductive sexual activity. This would mean that non-
reproductive sex is of lesser value, and is perhaps of very little or even of no value. People 
who enjoy engaging in non-reproductive sex would be making a mistake about the nature 
of the good life. Moreover, it may well be a fairly significant mistake if valuable sexual 
activity is a weighty component of a good life. It may be so significant that a perfectionist 
state could be justified in interfering in the lives of those who are making the mistake.
These examples illustrate how it is possible that a perfectionist state could sanction 
oppression. Perfectionists may respond that these are crude characterisations of what 
a perfectionist state would be like. There are many other considerations to take into 
account, they would argue, which result in it being less likely that a perfectionist state 
would be oppressive. Here, for example, is what Sher says about the worry of religious 
oppression: 
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If someone believes the price of wickedness is an eternity in hell, he will quite properly 
take worldly harmony to be of little moment. By his lights, saving souls – his own and 
those of others – will indeed be the only thing worth doing. But not all religious doc-
trines do have such extreme implications, and many conceptions of the good are not 
religious at all. Thus, very few in our (or any other Western) society have this sort of 
reason to pull out all the stops […] [Usually] even the most passionate adherent of a 
particular conception of the good is well able to moderate his demands (1997, 121-122). 
Elsewhere in Beyond Neutrality, Sher also sets forth what a perfectionist theory on his 
view should say about sexuality. In his view, sexual activity should be private because it 
involves the ability to bestow personal information selectively. This would count against 
promiscuous impersonal sex, but not against non-reproductive sex. Moreover, non- 
reproductive sex would not be condemned based on his view that only near-unavoidable 
goals are valuable. Many people, Sher notes, have “no interest in reproducing at all. When 
someone lacks such interest, it is hard to see how his using his sexual organs to reproduce 
would make the world a better place or him better off” (1997, 218). 
Reasoning of this type may demonstrate that perfectionism need not be oppressive 
(although Sher’s view would seem to sanction intervention against sexual promiscuity). 
There are other considerations that perfectionists would claim have to be taken into account:
i.   With regard to religion there is the Lockean argument that religious devotion 
requires inner persuasion of the mind, and since external compulsion cannot bring 
about inner states, there is no point in coercing people into religion (Locke 2005).
ii.   Perhaps the good is pluralistic; perhaps, that is, there are many forms of the good 
and they are equally valuable or incommensurable in the sense that they are not 
worth more or less than each other, but nor are they equally valuable; they are 
simply valuable in their own way (Raz 1986). If so there would be no reason for 
intervention guiding people away from lifestyles.
iii.  Perhaps the good life must be an autonomous one or one that expresses indi-
viduality or that in some other way depends on personal choice. 
Sher holds that the good is fragmented and plural and that autonomy, desire-satisfaction, 
and happiness are important goods (1997, 120). If so, and if the reasons for personal choice 
are important enough to outweigh whatever value there may be in forcing people into 
valuable activities, then the nature of the good will be less in favour of oppressive govern-
ment intervention of the kind that I have suggested. These claims about the good will 
not be assessed here (but see Clarke 2006). They may turn out to be true and weighty. 
If so, then perfectionism would not lead to oppression. For ease of reference, I will 
refer henceforth to the possibility of the good turning out to be such that it motivates 
oppression as ‘the good is oppressive’ while that it does not as ‘the good is non-oppressive’.
We can now see the reasoning behind prophylactic neutrality. Perfectionist con-
siderations may be incompatible with individual rights due to the nature of the good. 
Depending on how the nature of the good turns out – whether the good is oppressive or 
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not – then perfectionism may or may not be oppressive. If the nature of the good is non-
oppressive, then Sher is right to hold that neutrality is not necessary in order to avoid 
oppression. But if instead the good is oppressive then perfectionism would be oppressive 
and – insofar as oppression is something we want to avoid – the prophylactic case for 
neutralism would stand.
Is the nature of the good oppressive or not? Much work still remains to be done to 
answer this question. Before we can respond we need to know, among other things, the 
truth about religion, about sexuality, about value pluralism, and about the importance 
of autonomy and individuality in the good life. In our present state of uncertainty about 
these questions, there is a case for neutralism. Either government could be perfectionist 
– which may or may not result in oppression depending on the nature of the good – or 
it could be neutral, in which case it has less reason to be oppressive. Given the dangers 
of oppression we should err on the side of caution and embrace neutralism because oth-
erwise, if government is perfectionist, the nature of the good may turn out to be oppres-
sive. True, the good may turn out not to be oppressive, but we should not take the risk.
This precautionary reasoning is similar to Pascal’s wager, according to which the 
consequences of not believing in God if God turns out to exist are much worse than the 
consequences of believing in God. If you choose the former, you will receive eternity in 
hell, but if you opt for the latter you will be granted eternity in heaven (and if it turns out 
that God does not exist then all you have wasted is some time and effort in worshipping). 
You will not lose much if you turn out to be wrong but you will gain a lot if you turn 
out to be correct. As Pascal wrote: “Let us compare the two cases; if you win, you win 
everything; if you lose, you lose nothing. Don’t hesitate then. Take a bet that he exists” 
(Pascal 2009, 536).
The case for prophylactic neutrality applies a similar kind of reasoning to the 
question of whether government should be neutral. The nature of the good could be 
oppressive or it could not be. Either the state could be perfectionist; if the good is 
oppressive then the result could be oppression; if the good is non-oppressive then op-
pression is less likely. Or the state could be neutral; if the good is oppressive then it will 
not matter since the state will not be guided by it and the result is that government is 
less likely to be oppressive; if the good is non-oppressive then the result is still the same. 
The rational wager is towards neutrality. If we accept perfectionism, the result could be 
terrible if the good turned out to be oppressive. But if we accept neutralism and the good 
turns out to be non-oppressive then we have lost something – the gains of perfectionist 
policies – but these surely are a sacrifice worth making in order to avoid the dangers of 
oppression. By accepting neutralism we gain the huge advantage of avoiding oppression. 
The alternative would not gain us much.
This is in a sense a reversal of Pascal’s wager, because the latter was for religion while 
the reverse is against the use of religion in politics (or conceptions of the good life gener-
ally). It is not actually a wager against being religious – that might still be a good bet on a 
personal level – but it is a wager against permitting religion (and conceptions of the good) 
to have influence in politics.
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Even though it has the same structure as Pascal’s wager, the reverse wager avoids 
the main difficulty usually thought to apply to Pascal’s. Pascal’s wager assumes that belief 
is a matter of choice; that you can just decide to believe in God or not. But this is prob-
ably false; belief is determined by how the evidence and arguments appear to you and is 
not subject to direct control (Taliaferro 1998, 381; Zagzebski 2007, 64). While this is a 
problem for Pascal’s wager, it does not apply here, for accepting neutralism is a matter of 
choice unlike a belief in God. Society can just decide that government should be neutral 
rather than perfectionist and implement that decision by adopting political arrangements 
that rule out perfectionist policies. The neutralism-perfectionism issue is a matter of 
choice to decide upon, unlike a personal belief in God.
It is important to be clear about what kind of argument is being made here. Some-
times perfectionism is objected to on pragmatic grounds; the worry is that the state could 
implement misguided or false conceptions of the good. Religious fanatics, for example, 
could implement their false views through the state. (Raz 1986, 428-429; Quong 2011, 
35). That is not the argument being made here. The argument here is that even if the 
ideals of the good are truly ideals, even if they are worthwhile conceptions of the good, 
perfectionism could sanction their imposition, oppressively if necessary.
One possible objection to this case for prophylactic neutrality is that it rests on 
a claim about uncertainty about the good: that we are uncertain whether the good is 
oppressive or not. Many defenders of neutralism have appealed to uncertainty or scepti-
cism about the good as a way of ruling out state action based on conceptions of the good, 
but this strategy faces the criticism that other political claims – for example about justice 
and rights – are no more certain as claims about ideals of life (Clarke 1999; Quong 2011). 
As Sher puts it, there is no more reason to be sceptical about the good than there is to be 
sceptical about matters that neutralism holds that it is legitimate for government to act 
on the basis of (1997, 142). Since the reverse Pascal’s wager appeals to uncertainty about 
whether the good is oppressive or not, it seems open to this criticism of using scepticism 
about the good as a justification for neutralism.
The reverse wager for neutralism does indeed make a claim about uncertainty of 
the good: that we are uncertain whether the good is oppressive or not. But that is not 
the same as a claim of uncertainty about the good in general: that we do not hold any 
beliefs about the good with certainty. The latter does invite the response that our be-
liefs about justice and rights may similarly lack certainty. But although the more limited 
claim of uncertainty about whether the good is oppressive may similarly invite a response 
that we are uncertain whether a neutral state would be oppressive, that response is less 
convincing. For the reverse wager argument goes through provided it is more likely that 
perfectionism would be oppressive than it is that a neutral state would be oppressive. And that claim, 
as far as I can see, cannot help but be true. As has already been noted, a neutral state 
may well be oppressive, but a perfectionist state is more likely to be for the simple reason 
that the latter makes more reasons available for government to act on. The difference 
between neutralism and perfectionism is just that under the latter there are more reasons 
for state action than under the former. Hence, whatever sources of oppression there are 
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under neutralism are also present under perfectionism, and the latter has further sources, 
namely the motivation to promote conceptions of the good. So, we may be uncertain 
whether neutral reasons for state action would result in oppression, but a perfectionist 
state adds further reasons to these: nonneutral reasons for state action, and so we must 
be even more uncertain whether a perfectionist state would be oppressive.
The only way around this that I can see would be for perfectionists to show that the 
nature of the good is not only non-oppressive, but is even more oppression-minimising 
than a neutral state would be. For instance, they could argue that autonomy is so impor-
tant as an element of the good life that its relevance in a perfectionist state would coun-
teract any tendency towards oppression that would be present in a neutral state, as well as 
counteracting any tendency towards oppression in the nature of the good. Perhaps (so the 
argument would go) a neutral state would be oppressive, and perfectionism avoids this by 
emphasising the liberty-supporting elements of the good life. However we have already 
seen two reasons that when combined should make us doubt this strategy: (i) there are 
elements of the good that tend towards oppression, and (ii) we are uncertain whether the 
good will turn out to be oppressive or non-oppressive overall. Even taking into account 
the possibility that the nature of the good may push society away from oppression, the 
possibility of the opposite tendency should make us accept neutrality as the best bet.
Iv. conclusIon
Perfectionism may lead to oppression or it may not, depending on the nature of the 
good. The alternative, neutralism, may also result in oppression, but is less likely to since 
one set of motivations for oppression would be removed. To reduce the possibility of 
oppression, we should have a neutral state.
More work has to be done on comparing neutralism and perfectionism in terms 
of their likelihood of leading to oppression, but I hope to have supplied some reason to 
think that neutralism has an advantage in this respect. One assumption that has not been 
explored is why oppression is bad; a possible response to the view defended here is that 
even if perfectionism leads to oppression we should just accept it. Perhaps oppression 
in the name of furthering the good is justified. That, however, would be a bold move for 
defenders of perfectionism such as Sher to make.
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notes
1. This position would have to reply to the standard objection that in its supposedly non-
coercive realm such as funding decisions, it actually is coercive since the taxes used to raise funds 
are coercively imposed. 
Neutralism, Perfectionism and Respect for Persons
Michael Schefczyk – Leuphana Universität, Lüneburg, Germany
I. IntroductIon
Neutralism, which is roughly speaking the doctrine that the state should not implement 
or promote ideals of the good life (Barry 1965/1970, 69ff.; Raz 1986, 110ff.; Sher 1997, 
34), is a broad church. It ranges from a purist commitment to full self-ownership as 
the fundamental moral right, which we find in libertarianism (Nozick 1974/1999; van 
Parijs 1995; for a critical discussion Wall 2009), to more nuanced views prevailing in 
liberal egalitarianism (Rawls 1993; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2001), libertarian paternalism 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008) or in John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarian liberalism (Mill 
1863/1969).
In contrast to Sher’s declaration that “neutralism is false” (1997, 3), I shall argue 
that neutral states can do a lot in order to promote the good life of the residents. A plau-
sible form of neutralism does not exclude perfectionist reasons tout court from political 
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deliberation. However, the role of perfectionist reasons in political affairs must be framed 
by an appropriately conceived principle of neutrality. Unlike Sher, I argue that one can 
take a perfectionist theory of the good and most of Sher’s political concerns aboard 
without sacrificing the principle of neutrality. Contrary to other forms of moderate 
neutralism (e.g. Weinstock 1999) or mild perfectionism (e.g. Chan 2000), my approach 
rests on the idea that respect for autonomously chosen (decent) reasons constitutes a 
constraint on the scope of perfectionist intervention.
II. neutralIsm as a prIncIple of polItIcal moralIty
In what I conceive to be the most plausible interpretation, neutralism is a theory of 
political morality that deals with the obligations of public officials, lawmakers and 
citizens (‘political neutralism’). The core of political neutralism is the principle of neutral-
ity. It is a moral requirement with respect to the reasons and goals of political agents.1 
A neutral state is one in which political agents comply to a large extent with this require-
ment. The principle of neutrality prohibits political agents from using their power to 
promote a particular conception of the good (I abbreviate ‘conception of the good’ as 
‘Conception’ in the following). I follow Rawls in understanding a Conception as the 
product of one of our fundamental moral powers. In Justice as Fairness, he remarks that 
a Conception is “an ordered family of ends” which is “normally set within, and inter-
preted by, certain comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines” (2001, 19; 
italics mine). I take the ‘normally’ as a hint that a Conception may lack a metaphysical 
component. If so, it could consist simply of a more or less determinate scheme of final 
ends. Moreover, Rawls states that Conceptions specify our loyalty to various groups and 
associations, and that the flourishing of these groups and associations is “also part of our 
conception of the good” (1993, 19). This I call the social component. Again I interpret the 
social component not as a necessary condition, but as a typical element of a Conception.
In a nutshell, a Conception is a “scheme of final ends” (or an “ordered family of 
ends”) that individuals formulate in exercise of one of their fundamental moral powers. 
Typically, the value component of a Conception is supported by a metaphysical and a 
social component.
Conceptions have parts that are ‘universal’ insofar as they are shared by all or almost 
all people (‘universal parts’). Here are some examples of universal beliefs: all or almost all 
conceive pleasure to be an intrinsic value (value component). The belief that we are not 
brains in a vat is near-universal; and all or almost all people desire the flourishing of their 
family or political community (social component). However, Conceptions also have parts 
that are not near-universal; these are the ‘idiosyncratic parts’. Parts of Conceptions can be 
idiosyncratic because they express personal views or tastes, on the one hand, or because 
they are the result of reasonable disagreements, on the other hand. As Rawls puts it, “it 
is not to be expected that conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after 
free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion” (1993, 58). Different, and possibly 
incompatible, conclusions may be supported by sufficiently good (or decent) reasons. 
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Political neutralism favours a minimal standard according to which reasons are decent 
if they do not involve evident falsities or logical fallacies. I presume that it is frequently 
a matter of reasonable disagreement whether an issue is, indeed, a matter of reasonable 
disagreement. For instance, some people are convinced that moral realism: the belief in a 
personal god or perfectionism is unreasonable; but others disagree.
In numerous passages, Sher seems to assert that Rawls objects to all attempts of 
political agents to promote valuable lives (1997, 83 et passim). Whatever the correct 
interpretation of Rawls’ view, political neutralism only criticises the promotion of idi-
osyncratic parts of Conceptions. When political neutralists demand that political agents 
should stay neutral with regard to particular conceptions of the good, they do not mean 
that governments should refrain from promoting the good. What they mean is that 
political agents should abstain from promoting non-universal value beliefs that are typically 
supported by debatable metaphysical and social views.
These preliminary remarks are helpful in order to understand what I take to be the 
core concern of neutralism. An officeholder who promotes the idiosyncratic part of a 
comprehensive Conception does not write on a blank slate. He or she interferes with the 
Conceptions of residents. The residents employ their capacity to reasonable reflection 
in order to arrive at considered judgements. Political interference forces individuals to 
deviate from what they see as good and reasonable. This interference is not just piece-
meal, but deep and systematic, because a Conception has a certain degree of unity and 
comprehensiveness.
According to political neutralism, the notion ‘overlapping consensus’ refers to the 
universal part of Conceptions. The universal part of Conceptions comprises value claims 
of a diverse nature. Some claims are universal because they are self-evident in the sense 
that any attempt to give further reasons for them seems to be awry; the goodness of 
pleasure may be a case in point. Other claims are universal in the sense that they are 
widely shared and supported by strong emotions, like certain beliefs about decency. In 
contrast to self-evident beliefs, these claims are typically supported by further considera-
tions. Some of these supporting considerations do not belong to the universal part of 
Conceptions. With regard to these claims, there is no overlapping consensus on the level 
of justification. In view of this, it seems helpful to distinguish between ‘surface consen-
sus’ and ‘in-depth consensus’. Surface consensus occurs if there is agreement regarding 
the reasonableness of a claim, but no agreement regarding its appropriate justification. 
In-depth consensus arises if there is agreement regarding both, claim and justification. 
This sheds light on the distinction between ‘neutral’ and ‘non-neutral reasons’ (see Sher 
1997, 22-27).
In sharp contrast to Sher, I believe that the principle of neutrality does not 
prohibit political agents “to support any law or policy on the basis of any particu-
lar conception of the good life” (Sher 1997, 131). For the principle does not require 
political agents to act on the basis of an in-depth consensus. Political agents makes no 
moral mistake, if their reason for promoting the realisation of a certain value, which 
lies within the bounds of a surface consensus, belongs to their idiosyncratic conception 
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of the good. They can support compulsory schooling for quite different reasons; they 
may be convinced that knowledge is an intrinsic value, like Thomas Hurka (1993, 159; 
2010, 75-96); or they may believe that the cultivation of higher faculties gives access 
to higher pleasures, like John Stuart Mill (1863/1969, 211). It is in keeping with the 
principle of neutrality to support a law or policy for decent, but idiosyncratic, reasons 
unless one has reason to believe that there is no surface consensus regarding the law or 
the policy. Such a surface consensus is not just a compromise. All parties agree that an 
institution or policy is reasonable, even if they disagree with respect to the appropriate 
justification.2
Against this backdrop, the disagreement between perfectionism and neutralism is 
perhaps of a different nature than Sher opines. Sher’s perfectionism conceives certain 
traits or activities as inherently valuable because they are linked to fundamental human 
capacities. A capacity is fundamental if it “is both near-universal and near-inescapable” 
(Sher 1997, 202). Some of these fundamental capacities are directed at specific goals; 
although these goals are rooted in near-universal and near-inescapable capacities, many 
persons fail to pursue them. As I said before, the principle of neutrality repudiates the 
promotion of idiosyncratic (parts of) comprehensive Conceptions; but fundamental 
goals are defined as near-universal and near-inescapable. Thus, by definition, funda-
mental goals must belong to the universal part and political neutralists have no reser-
vations about the promotion of universally shared goals. Of course, neutralists and 
perfectionists, like Sher, can disagree in their views about fundamental goals, but such 
disagreement would be nothing unusual. It is conceivable, even likely, that different 
political neutralists will arrive at diverging, considered judgements as to which justifi-
catory reasons are eligible, because they have different views concerning the universal 
part of Conceptions. Rawls himself seems to be convinced that the universal part is 
exhausted by the list of primary goods; but this is a debatable claim. Claims about what 
belongs to the universal part are themselves objects of reasonable disagreement. This 
confronts us with the question as to the specific nature of the dispute between neutral-
ism and perfectionism. The principle of neutrality does not prohibit political agents 
from supporting a bill or a policy for perfectionist reasons. This is my response to 
Sher’s objection that it “is, to say the least, not self-evident that even the weightiest of 
perfectionist reasons – reasons that should and often do guide our personal conduct 
– should have no weight at all in our deliberations about law and public policy” (1997, 
17; italics original). Whether perfectionist reasons are eligible or not depends upon the 
contingent nature of the overlapping consensus. If officeholders have reasons to be-
lieve (p) that the proposed perfectionist bill or policy is part of an overlapping (surface 
– or in-depth) consensus, their support is not a violation of the neutrality requirement. 
But if they have no such belief (p), they exert, from the point of view of the dissenting 
residents, arbitrary power.
To summarise, political neutralism is not in conflict with perfectionist reasons per 
se. It repudiates a form of perfectionism that licenses political agents to justify laws and 
policies with idiosyncratic reasons. 
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III. forms of Interference and the respect argument
Sher distinguishes threats, incentives, non-rational manipulation and the provision of 
valuable options as four methods of potentially beneficial state intervention. Some, but 
certainly not all, neutralists reject all four methods. John Stuart Mill, for instance, was 
primarily worried about what he called “authoritative intervention”, the use of coercive 
means. In the Principles of Political Economy and elsewhere he declares that coercion “requires 
a much stronger necessity to justify it” than unauthoritative intervention (1848/1965, 
937). Both forms of political interference can be justified. Mill repeatedly refers to his 
arguments against state intervention as presumptions, as claims, which put the burden 
of proof on the opponent. One justifying reason for coercive intervention consists in 
the prevention of actions which people would undoubtedly not desire to perform if they 
had all relevant information. Mill gives the famous example of someone who is about to 
cross an unsafe bridge. If the only way to prevent his crossing is to “seize him and turn 
him back”, “no real infringement of his liberty occurs”, says Mill: “for liberty consists in 
doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river” (1859/1977, 294).
Thus, Mill concedes the eligibility of state intervention in order to prevent some 
forms of involuntary harm to the self. Most versions of neutralism agree with Mill that 
the interference with such actions is unobjectionable (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
The situation is different with regard to well-informed choices. Steven Wall gives 
the example of “an adult man, while of sound mind, desires to consume a recreational 
drug known to cause serious health problems. The man is aware of these dangers, but 
desires to consume the drug anyway” (Wall 2009, 403). Would it be morally in order if a 
public officer “forcibly prevents him from doing so for his own good”? From the point 
of view of political neutralism, the first question to be asked in this scenario is whether 
the public officer interferes with the person’s autonomy. It is by no means obvious that 
the answer has to be in the affirmative. The fact that the man is aware of the danger in-
volved in taking the drug and that he is of sound mind does not imply that he is respon-
sive to all relevant reasons. For instance, he may use an unreasonably high discount rate 
regarding his future desires or give no due weight to the consequences of his foreseeable 
health problems on other present desires. Under these circumstances, many, perhaps 
most, neutralists would argue that state intervention would be acceptable, since it does 
not override the point of view of the affected person.
Given that I consider the eligibility of state interference with respect to heterono-
mous and self-harming choices to be uncontroversial, I shall focus on interference with 
autonomous choices in the following.
The principle of neutrality asserts that political agents make a moral mistake if they 
support laws or policies in order to override the decent Conceptions of residents. A 
Conception is decent if it is supported by sufficiently good reasons. I shall argue that 
the principle is based on the general moral idea that we are under an obligation to re-
spect the autonomy of other persons. Non-neutral actions of political agents are morally 
wrong because they infringe the residents’ claim to respect for autonomy. Sher differen-
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tiates between, arguments for the principle of neutrality that are based on the ‘value of 
autonomy’ (value argument) on the one hand, and arguments that are based on ‘respect for 
autonomy’ (respect argument) on the other. The basic idea of the value argument is that 
the non-neutral use of political power diminishes the goodness of people’s lives because it 
interferes with autonomy. In contrast, the respect argument claims that political authori-
ties are obliged not to interfere with autonomous choices because any such interference 
is a form of disrespect for the affected person. Both arguments arrive at the conclusion 
that political authorities must not interfere with the sphere of ‘personal sovereignty’. But 
they differ as to why the state should respect autonomous choices. The value argument 
justifies the principle of neutrality on the basis of a premise about the good life. The 
respect argument, in contrast, justifies the principle of neutrality on the basis of a premise 
about how the state should treat its residents. The value argument maintains that state 
interference worsens people’s lives. The respect argument leaves this question open. It 
is compatible with the respect argument that some forms of interference are disregard-
ful, and therefore wrong, even if they improve people’s lives. If one accepts the respect 
argument, one is committed to the view that one can be obliged to abstain from actions 
that would make the lives of others’ better. Why could it be possibly wrong to promote 
the well-being of another person? 
The Respect Argument
i. Interference with autonomous choice disrespects the affected person. 
ii. It is morally wrong to disrespect persons. 
iii.  Political agents who support laws and policies that interfere with individual auton-
omy in order to promote idiosyncratic Conceptions disrespect person (non-neutral 
intervention).
iv. Thus non-neutral intervention is morally wrong.
The respect argument does not exploit one widely acknowledged consideration in favour 
of state neutrality. Following Sher, one may call it the ‘error argument’. The point of the 
argument is that, because the state will err in a critical number of cases, it will lead to 
better results if the political authorities stay neutral. In contrast, the respect argument 
proposes that it would be wrong to interfere with of autonomous choices even if it were 
beyond reasonable doubt that such interference would improve the lives of the affected 
persons. This confronts us with two questions: (i) What are autonomous choices and (ii) 
in what sense can such choices be non-optimal?
Regarding the first question, I agree with Sher that autonomy can be conceptual-
ised as reason-responsiveness and that, among other things, “an agent’s desires, history, 
capacities, and traits” (1997, 52) are reason-generating. People choose autonomously if 
their choices respond to their actual reasons. Moreover, I take Sher’s assumption aboard 
that “an autonomous act need not be supported by the agent’s strongest reasons” (1997, 
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54; italics original). Autonomy has thus a passive and an active component, so to speak. 
The passive component consists in the ability to understand which aspects of a situation 
generate reasons. In contrast, the active component consists in the capacity to produce a 
choice that is supported by (at least) decent reasons. People who fail to understand their 
actual reasons or who fail to take an option that is supported by (at least) decent reasons 
do not act autonomously.
Sher gives the following example for an autonomous (but suboptimal) choice: X has 
a strong desire to marry Y, but “also knows that their marriage will fail unless he gives up 
his career. Suppose, further, that X knows that his talents are modest and that his career 
is not promising in any event. Knowing all this, X may well have more reason to marry 
Y than to pursue his career” (1997, 53-54). Since X has most reason to marry Y, it would 
be best for him to marry Y. Let us assume that he is about to choose the decent (but 
suboptimal) option and split up with Y in order to pursue his career. Under these circum-
stances, his life would run a better course if the decent (but suboptimal) option would be 
externally blocked by coercion, non-rational manipulation or incentives. Consequently, it 
is conceivable that interference induces X to do what is best for him (in terms of actual 
reasons that would obtain without interference).
Respect for autonomy implies respect for autonomous, but non-optimal choices. 
A respects X as an autonomous person, if A does not try to interfere with X’s autono-
mously chosen plan P1 (to pursue his career) even if A knows that a better feasible plan 
P2 (marrying Y) exists for X.
The respect argument rejects interference with autonomously chosen plans – but what, 
precisely, constitutes objectionable interference with autonomy? To this end, I shall 
introduce the notion of ‘first-person authority’. First-person authority is the right of a 
person P to decide to which of his or her (P’s) decent reasons he or she (P) responds. 
I shall examine four candidates for the title of objectionable infringement of first-person 
authority. 
John Stuart Mill famously argued that advice and persuasion are justifiable forms 
of intervention (1859/1977, 292). It does not seem disrespectful per se if A shares with 
X her reasons to believe that X would have a better life if he were to follow P2 instead 
of P1. But if X is an autonomous person, he has the right to decide whether and to what 
extent he wants to hear or heed A’s advice. Special relations, like friendships, are charac-
terised by giving A the license or even the responsibility to be more insisting in sharing 
her thoughts on X’s well-being. Nonetheless, even among friends, it is X’s right to decide 
whether and when he has heard enough. X has the right to decide whether and when 
he is accessible to A’s views about what he, X, has most reason to do. The first form of 
objectionable interference with autonomy consists in violating this right. As I see it, this 
right is uncontroversial. A fortiori, it should be uncontroversial that X has the right to 
decide to which of his decent reasons he responds.
The second form of objectionable interference with autonomous choice consists 
in the use of threats. A threatens X, if she changes X’s choice set by introducing an 
unattractive prospect in case of non-compliance. The unattractive prospects range from 
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Mill’s ‘natural penalty’ of avoidance (“if you idiot don’t marry Y, I will never talk to 
you again”) to torture and killing. By threatening, A produces intentionally new reasons 
(avoidance of unattractive prospects) and thus infringes X’s first-person authority.
Non-rational manipulation changes X’s perception and evaluation of his options by 
making use of causal mechanisms unrelated to X’s independent reasons. For instance, A 
may try to make X jealous of Z who is also after Y; or A may tell X time and again that 
other men were willing to die for Y, thereby exploiting the tendency to conform with 
the judgement of the many. Non-rational manipulation is a seemingly unobtrusive way 
of promoting the good of X. Benevolently tricking someone into doing what is best for 
him appears to be more acceptable than threatening him. Nonetheless, it interferes with 
X’s first-person authority.
An incentive enhances the attractiveness of an option. If A promises X to be-
queath him her house if he marries Y, she gives X an additional reason to marry Y. Some 
philosophers have reservations about incentives. Maybe the idea is that such interference 
diverts the attention from the reasons a person has independently of the interfering action 
(Julius 2011). For instance, a material incentive disturbs the process of X’s reflection as 
to whether a marriage with Y would be best in view of the ‘inherent qualities’ of such a 
relationship. But if this were reprobate, one would have to ignore all independent changes 
in material circumstances while pondering on the decision because they, too, divert the 
attention from ‘inherent qualities’. If X would win a house in the national lottery, he 
would possibly find it much easier to see that marrying Y is best for him, because the prize 
changes the relative costs and benefits of his career plans.3 However, there appears to be 
nothing objectionable about such a change of mind. By parity of reason, it is not obvious 
why the use of incentives should count as a form of infringement of first-person authority.
Iv. reasons for respect
Sher asks at one point: “If governments or their agents have well-grounded beliefs that 
residents’ lives are improved by close and committed family relationships, or that the 
breakdown of public civility is a bad thing, why shouldn’t they promote public civility or 
the family even at the cost of sacrificing some autonomy. Or, again, why shouldn’t they 
sacrifice some autonomy to promote such values as high culture or communal solidarity” 
(1997, 57).
When Sher speaks about “well-grounded beliefs” in this passage, he presumably 
has in mind beliefs that are supported by his “empirical substitute for a teleological es-
sentialism” or “poor man’s Aristotelianism” (1997, 240), as he puts it facetiously. Political 
neutralists would not regard it as morally wrong if political agents were to support laws 
or policies because they accept as true an “empirical substitute for a teleological essential-
ism” – as long as they are convinced that the law or the policy is part of an overlapping 
consensus. A political agent who is personally convinced that Sher’s empirically based 
essentialism is true, has to bear in mind that others might be not so convinced. Again, 
this lack of consensus is no cause for great worry, as long as people agree on the level of 
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political action. The promotion of public civility, the family, high culture or communal 
solidarity is possibly less divisive than the philosophical theories that provide the justify-
ing reasons. From the point of view of political neutralism, officeholders would just act 
morally wrongly if they were to promote a Conception of which they know that it is not 
in accordance with the value beliefs of a critical number of autonomous residents.4 I am 
not absolutely certain where Sher stands in this matter, but his position has certainly the 
most bite, if it states that “poor man’s Aristotelianism” licenses political agents to over-
ride autonomously chosen life-plans. 
Premise ‘i’ and ‘ii’ of the respect argument support the claim that it is morally 
wrong to interfere with autonomous choice. But what supports these premises? Why is it 
morally wrong to interfere with autonomous choice?
The most straightforward answer to this question claims that interference with 
autonomous choice infringes upon first-person authority and that this is the “bed-
rock where our spade is turned”5, as Wittgenstein has put it. First-person authority is a 
fundamental right not capable of further justification. Although I agree that first-person 
authority is fundamental, it seems possible to present some (admittedly very) sketchy 
remarks as to why it is fundamental – and these explanations have in my view some justifi-
catory power. Sher defines autonomy as the capacity to respond to reasons. This capacity 
is crucial for our notion of agency which, in turn, is a cornerstone of our understanding 
of what being human essentially means. Moreover, autonomy is not just an essential 
feature of human nature; the exercise of autonomous choice is also a precondition for 
experiencing one’s life as one’s own. Autonomous choice makes us human as well as 
making us an individual self. Both aspects explain why we have a supreme interest in 
autonomy; and it is this interest that first-person authority protects.
Let me emphasise that I do not claim that autonomy is a necessary condition of 
value in the sense that aspects of one’s life, which have not been chosen autonomously, 
lack value.6 An arranged marriage may be rich in many valuable experiences and activi-
ties. My claim is (i) that autonomy is essentially human, (ii) that autonomous choice is 
a precondition of experiencing one’s life as one’s own and (iii) that we have therefore a 
supreme interest in autonomy. It conflicts with first-person authority (and is, prima facie, 
wrong) to use political power with the intention:
(i)  to force people to live in ways, which they disapprove (at t1) with decent reasons 
(or to force people to abstain from a way of living, which they approve (at t1) with 
decent reasons).
(ii)  to non-rationally influence people’s normative judgements (at t1) in a way that 
causes them to lead a life, which they disapprove (at t1) with decent reasons (to 
non-rationally influence people to abstain from a way of living, which they 
approve (at t1) with decent reasons).
If you have decent reasons for your way of living, any attempt on my part to manipulate 
you by means of coercion or indoctrination infringes upon your first-person authority 
and disrespects you thereby.
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v. leeWay for polItIcal perfectIonIsm 
In the passage I quoted at the beginning of the last section, Sher raises the question why 
we should not “sacrifice some autonomy to promote such values as high culture or com-
munal solidarity” (1997, 57). Sher assumes that high culture and communal solidarity are 
valuable because they contribute to the attainment of our fundamental goals. They give 
us strong reasons for action, fundamental reasons, so to speak. The obvious question to 
ask is how the sacrifice of autonomy is possible if autonomy is defined as reason-respon-
siveness? We choose autonomously if we respond to the reasons we actually have. If high 
culture and communal solidarity are values that are related to fundamental reasons, how 
could autonomous agents possibly fail to respond to them? Which causal mechanism is 
responsible for such a misjudgement?
One possible answer is that A chooses a suboptimal option because A has acquired 
less than perfect tastes and habits. For example, A may dislike high culture and prefer 
pop culture. This gives him or her a decent reason to consume pop culture and to steer 
clear of high culture. His or her taste is less than perfect since it does not track his or 
her fundamental reasons in the optimal way. I call this the ‘spoiled taste explanation’. 
Another answer states that A may consider his or her decent reasons as optimal reasons. 
For instance, a devoted reader of postmodern aesthetics may doubt that there is more 
aesthetic value in a Verdi opera than in Pulp Fiction; or a Benthamite may deny that 
poetry is better than push-pin; someone may argue that communal solidarity comes with 
subtle forms of social control and is thus an ambivalent matter. In this manner, values, 
such as high culture and communal solidarity, may be questioned with sufficiently good 
reasons. There may be room for reasonable disagreements. I call this the ‘burden of 
judgement explanation’.
In a dynamic perspective, it is imaginable that the use of threats or non-rational 
manipulation enhances the quality of life and the autonomy of A by helping A to get rid 
of spoiled tastes and habits. Here I agree with Sher (1997, 63). But I claim that infringe-
ments of first-person authority are ineligible in cases of reasonable disagreement. This 
is another way of saying that political interference must be based on an overlapping 
consensus. The burden of judgement explanation may thus help us to shed some light on 
how consensus and autonomy are related. If all, or almost all, agree that some activity f 
does not contribute to life’s value, it is unlikely that one has decent reasons to f. Conse-
quently, it is very likely that people f non-autonomously. If, for instance, literally no one 
believes that typical cases of obesity or smoking crack can result from sufficiently good 
tastes and habits, political intervention is allowed.
What about the following case? A political agent proposes the use of public funds 
for an emotional advertising campaign that deters adults from extramarital sex. Does the 
political agent violate the principle of neutrality in this case? Let us assume that the 
campaign portrays extramarital sex as degrading, hazardous and destructive. It draws the 
viewer’s attention to the danger of destroying important social goods, like an intact family 
life, for a fleeting episode of lust; it shows how innocent young people are being deceived 
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and exploited by slick cynics; and it depicts with gusto the possibility of contracting re-
volting diseases. For the sake of argument, I shall assume that extramarital sex does indeed 
generally tend to worsen the life of all parties involved, but that there is no consensus to 
this effect in society. There are dissenters, believers in poly-fidelity, who obtain their inspi-
ration from books about the Bloomsbury Group or biographies on Jean Paul Sartre and 
Simone de Beauvoir. Under these circumstances, the value of extramarital sex seems to be 
a matter of reasonable disagreement and the government should refrain from interfering. 
Compare this with a law against smoking. One purpose of such a law would be, of 
course, to protect the inexperienced and weak-willed who are exposed to peer-pressure 
and massive commercial advertising and who do not respond to objective information 
about the risks involved in smoking. Since not even the cigarette industry seems prepared 
to make a case for the value of smoking, I presume that there is no case to be made to 
this effect. Thus no one seems to believe that smoking contributes to life’s value. This is 
good evidence for the general claim that smoking is typically not part of an autonomously 
chosen plan. The law would therefore be innocuous from a political neutralist point of 
view. I am perfectly aware that many a neutralist finds such a conclusion outrageous, in 
particular those who cherish Mill’s famous harm principle or those who think that people 
are self-owners. Arguably, a general law against smoking would be wrong for independ-
ent reasons. It would involve serious interference with privacy and probably produce 
undesirable side-effects, as is the case with other drugs. But I am convinced that we 
would be ill-advised to interpret first-person authority in a way that includes the right to 
groundless self-harming behaviour.7 
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notes
1. I agree with Sher that the idea of justificatory neutrality has an action-guiding dimension 
and refers to the reasons which a political agent takes into account during practical deliberation 
(Sher 1997, 27).  
2. The referee rightly points to the fact that I deviate from the dominant Rawlsian interpre-
tation of public reason, as articulated by Quong (2005) and Schwartzman (2004).  
3. Julius thinks there is a requirement for “any person that she not aim to produce an act, 
whether her own or another’s, except by helping the doer of the second act to do it for reasons 
she already has” (Julius 2011, 3). 
4. One might ask how many people constitute a “critical number of residents” and why 
numbers count at all. The number of people matters for epistemic reasons. The more people 
hold certain value beliefs, the more likely it is that sufficiently good reasons for these beliefs 
exist.  
5. “If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. 
Then I am inclined to say: This is simply what I do” (Wittgenstein 1953, §217). 
6. Sher examines this view in Beyond Neutrality (1997, 58-60). 
7. I wish to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions. 
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Neutrality as a Constraint on Political Reasoning
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I. IntroductIon
George Sher’s book Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics has, he says, two main pur-
poses. The first is to “defuse the main reasons to deny that the state may seek to promote 
the good”, the other is to “develop a conception of the good that is worth promoting” 
(1997, 1). In the present contribution, I will not be concerned with either of these aims. 
Instead, I will focus on Sher’s preliminary discussion of the “scope and meaning” of 
neutralism (1997, 20). I consider Sher’s careful analysis of the structure of neutralism one 
of the book’s virtues, alongside his original theory of the good and his comprehensive 
and convincing arguments against neutralism. This careful analysis inspires me to attempt 
some critique and development. 
I will defend an account of neutralism according to which this doctrine puts a con-
straint on what reasons should enter into political reasoning. What I defend is not neu-
tralism per se, but only this account of neutralism relative to competing accounts. I believe 
this account is an improvement on Sher’s, in terms of conceptual precision and norma-
tive plausibility, both in general and from the perspective of the doctrine’s proponents 
in particular.
I will present the account I favour as a development of Sher’s and will reach it 
via several steps. Like Sher’s account, my development builds on common ideas in the 
neutralism debate. If it is original at all, it is so only by being more precise than existing 
accounts in some respects, thereby avoiding common ambiguities. Like Sher, I will fo-
cus on the ‘first-order’ neutrality of politics, rather than on the ‘second-order’ neutrality 
of fundamental political principles like first-order neutralism.1 For ease of presentation 
I will speak throughout of ‘policies’, with the understanding that this can include any sort 
of government activity or any result of such activity. 
II. sher’s subjectIvIst account of justIfIcatIon 
The neutrality of policies can be determined either by their consequences or by their 
rationales (Kymlicka 1989). Sher’s account is focused on rationales rather than conse-
quences and more specifically on justification rather than motives. This is the dominant 
interpretation of neutralism, though the distinction between justification and motives is 
often blurred by speaking loosely of making decision ‘on the basis of’ nonneutral reasons, 
or similar expressions (e.g. Caney 1991).
In rejecting motivational neutralism, Sher notes that this approach requires that 
a set of reasons be identified (namely those that motivated the relevant people in the 
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relevant way) that are then to be checked for neutrality. As an alternative approach, Sher 
proposes that we search more widely for whatever justification qualifies as neutral in the 
right way and then treat that justification as the relevant one (1997, 24). He calls such a 
justification a ‘possible argument’. This is an interesting strategy with clear advantages 
over motive-focused accounts. However, Sher’s account shares with motive-focused ac-
counts the assumption that a rationale must be identified. To anticipate, I will later argue 
that this assumption should be rejected. 
In chapter 2 of his book, Sher considers three alternative formulations of neutral-
ism. Here is the first:
(N) A law, institution, or other political arrangement is neutrally justifiable if and only 
if some possible argument for it has only neutral normative premises (1997, 25).
The problem with this formulation, Sher argues, is that it is too weak – for any policy 
there is a possible argument with neutral premises. Simply to identify a neutral argument 
is insufficient for neutrality, since this argument may be insubstantial or even based on 
mistake. Sher therefore considers this strengthened formulation:
(N’) A law, institution, or other political arrangement is neutrally justifiable if and only 
if at least one possible argument for it (1) has only neutral normative premises, and 
(2) contains no falsehoods or inferential mistakes, and (3) provides a reason for adopt-
ing the law, etc., that is stronger than the reasons provided by any arguments for any 
alternative arrangement (1997, 25).
The problem with this formulation, Sher argues, is that it is too strong – it is too demand-
ing to require that neutral policies be optimal policies. This leads Sher to settle for the 
following formulation, stronger than the first but weaker than the second:
(N’’) A law, institution, or other political arrangement is neutrally justifiable if and only 
if at least one possible argument for it (1) has only neutral normative premises, and 
(2) contains no implausible premises or obvious fallacies, and (3) provides a justifica-
tion of reasonable strength (1997, 26).
(N’’) stands out among these three formulations by relying heavily on subjective judg-
ment. Sher correctly notes that “implausible”, “obvious” and “reasonable” are all both 
vague and “relative to certain background beliefs” (1997, 26). He quite consciously makes 
neutralism a subjective doctrine in this sense. The judgments or beliefs in question, Sher 
proposes, are those of whoever is considering the argument in practical deliberation. 
Possible arguments, similarly, are arguments that are recognized as possible by the de-
liberator. In other words, as far as any policymaker is concerned, a policy is neutral if he 
or she can think of a neutral argument that, according to his or her own lights, contains 
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no implausible premises or obvious fallacies and provides a justification of reasonable 
strength.2 
III. agaInst subjectIve neutralIsm
The subjective (N’’) is too relativist. According to this account of neutralism, we cannot 
criticise a policymakers for being insufficiently neutral by pointing out to them that their 
supposedly neutral argument, which they find convincing, is in fact invalid, leaving only 
nonneutral arguments to support their policy. What we can do, of course, is to criticise 
them for being mistaken about the validity of their argument. However, such mistakes do 
not by themselves conflict with neutrality. I suppose that a policy may be nonneutral to 
us if we consider it in our practical deliberation and find it lacking a neutral justification. 
This does not mean, however, that the policy is nonneutral to the policymaker, nor that 
he or she has any reason to change his or her mind.
I consider it most typical and most reasonable to be concerned with what arguments 
are in fact valid, regardless of how things seem to any particular person. For example, 
it is reasonable to be concerned when a policy is neutral, or nonneutral, according to 
(N’’), only because of a mistake of practical deliberation. It may seem that we could 
introduce further terminology to deal with this, using terms like ‘objectively neutral’ and 
‘objectively nonneutral’ to capture what policies would be neutral or nonneutral if there 
were no mistakes. However, what we are after, or should be after, is a single definition of 
neutralism that accommodates reasonable liberal concerns regarding political neutrality. 
This definition, I believe, cannot be Sher’s subjective formulation.
Sher probably ascribes this subjective character to neutralism because he finds it 
reasonable, even though he is, ultimately, aiming to refute neutralism. That Sher is gener-
ous in this sense is indicated by the fact that the principle (M), which Sher later proposes 
as a superior alternative to neutralism, also only requires that policies seem justified to the 
deliberator, as opposed to actually being supported by valid reasons:
(M) Do not support any law or policy on the basis of any conception of the good that 
you have not scrutinized and found to satisfy your usual standards of justification 
(1997, 131).3
While (M) is importantly different from (N’’) in not attempting to define what policies 
are neutrally justifiable, but rather just issues a requirement, (M) shares with (N’’) the 
subjective approach: the standards of justification are those of whoever is considering 
supporting or otherwise taking action in regard to a policy. 
Interestingly, Sher seems at times quite aware of the inherent problems with this 
form of subjectivism. In chapter 2, he presents two arguments against motivational neu-
tralism, which both have to do with its subjective nature. First, because most laws and 
policies are implemented by many people acting together and because each of these 
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people typically have mixed motives for their actions, it is very difficult or even impos-
sible to determine when a policy is motivationally neutral: 
[M]ost laws and policies are implemented not by single individuals but by many people 
acting in concert, and most agents have a variety of reasons for what they do. Thus, 
on the current [motivational] proposal, the legitimacy of most political arrangements 
will be very difficult if not impossible to ascertain (1997, 24).
Second, a neutralism of motives would entail that nonneutral laws can be made neutral 
by being repealed and then passed again with different motives (1997, 24) The first argu-
ment shows that motivational neutralism is useless in practice, though not necessarily 
unreasonable; while the second argument shows that motivational neutralism is norma-
tively arbitrary, which is difficult to accept.
These two arguments in chapter 2 lead Sher to favour his own justificatory neutral-
ism as the most plausible version of neutralism. From chapter 3 onwards, the book aims 
to undermine the supposedly most plausible version of neutralism. In pursuing this aim, 
however, Sher later presents the following argument against neutralism: 
Because policy makers and legislators are not always candid, because individuals often 
lack insight into their own reasons, and because different persons can support the same 
laws or policies on very different grounds, there is often no way to discover whether, 
or to what degree, a proscribed sort of justification has been operative (1997, 117).
This is essentially the same argument as the first argument levied against motivational 
neutralism earlier in the book. The second argument against motivational neutralism 
can also be applied to Sher’s account of justificatory neutralism: justificatory neutralism 
entails that nonneutral laws or policies can be made neutral by being repealed and then 
passed again after a practical deliberation based on different reasons. Admittedly, his 
justification must seem sufficiently strong and correct if the policy is to be made neutral. 
However, this requirement is analogous to the way the alternative motives used to make 
laws neutral according to the motivational account must be able to motivate lawmakers. 
In both cases, the prospects for neutrality hinge on the psychological flexibility of the 
relevant agent(s). Since this is a serious flaw in motivational neutralism, as Sher recog-
nizes, it should not be built into our best account of neutralism.
While insisting on subjectivity for neutralism and for his own favoured principle 
(M), Sher is far from a thoroughgoing subjectivist. On his stated view of practical delib-
eration, an agent’s reasons are “provided by his situation” and in that sense objective, 
independent of the agent’s state of mind (1997, 48). Values, too, are objective in the 
sense that they are “outside the subjectivity of the person” (1997, 219). Yet when Sher 
formulates the doctrine that purports to restrict the reach of these objective reasons, he 
opts for apparent validity only. I propose that a superior alternative, and one not alien to 
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Sher’s own overall approach, is to place these restrictions outside the subjectivity of the 
person, together with reasons and values.
Iv. neutralIsm, justIfIcatIon and reasonIng 
I have argued against the subjective elements of Sher’s favoured formulation (N’’). I now 
turn to another problem, which is shared by all three formulations that Sher considers, 
including the objective (N’). The problem stems from the fact that all three formulations 
purport to say when a policy is or could be justified, which means they include their 
own theory of justification. According to (N’), justification has to do with recognizing 
as possible an argument that one believes to have certain qualities. According to (N’’), 
it has to do with recognizing as possible an argument that in fact has certain qualities. 
In both cases, neutralism is wedded to a particular theory of justification, or to bits of 
such a theory. This is problematic because it is a matter of great controversy what exactly 
justification is. If neutralism presupposes some particular theory of justification, it stands 
or falls with that theory.
Making neutralism dependent on a theory of justification may not be a great prob-
lem if one is operating within a larger framework which includes such a theory, such as, 
arguably, John Rawls’ (e.g. 1997) idea of public reason, though conclusions concerning 
neutralism are then valid only within that framework. If, however, like Sher, we are trying 
to assess the doctrine of neutralism rather independently of other commitments, then 
this dependence on a theory of justification is clearly unfortunate. One of the controver-
sies concerning justification is to what extent it is subjective and to what extent objective, 
as shown by my critique of Sher’s subjective approach. This controversy is not at the 
heart of interpreting neutrality as such. To see this, assume that for some policy, only 
reasons that all agree are neutral are invoked or relevant. This does not preclude disagree-
ment on whether the policy can be justified (or justifiable) for one person and not for 
another. Another controversy surrounding justification, and a largely unsolved problem, 
concerns how exactly a number of different reasons can lead to a normative conclusion. 
Yet another concerns whether the proper process of reasoning is different for different 
sorts of justification-like normative conclusions.4
The dependence on some theory of justification can be avoided by understand-
ing neutralism as a constraint on reasoning that filters out nonneutral reasons, or facts 
that would otherwise be or provide nonneutral reasons. Any theory of justification must 
include a role for reasons as input. Neutralism as a constraint on reasoning can be applied 
to filter this input, independently of the process that, based on the remaining input, yields 
an output in the form of a justification. Not only is neutralism on this account independ-
ent of the nature of justification, it is also independent of whether the reasoning process 
is one of justification at all, or perhaps instead a process of forming motivations, or one 
of public deliberation that may or may not yield a justification. The constraint can apply 
to any process that takes reasons as input.
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Defining neutralism in terms of reasoning may seem a step towards subjectivity, 
since justification can be mind-independent, while reasoning only goes on in our minds. 
Whether justification can be mind-independent is controversial, as is whether the justi-
fication of political arrangements is a special sort of justification – political justification – 
different in kind from (other forms of) moral justification. In fact, it is not obvious how 
we should individuate reasons more generally: is the fact that some policy will benefit 
some people one reason, which can be invoked in different sorts of justificatory reason-
ing, such as prudential and moral, or is it rather that this fact provides or constitutes 
several different reasons, one for each sort of reasoning? These are questions practi-
cally oriented neutralists need not answer before they formulate their doctrine. That the 
neutralist constraint applies to reasoning means that it applies to the way we deal with 
reasons, whatever they are exactly and whether or not they can exist independently of 
our dealing with them. 
v. neutralIty as constraInt
The rather simple idea that neutralism filters out reasons is neither new nor uncom-
mon. It is, for example, how neutralism is understood by the important critics Steven 
Wall (1998) and Peter de Marneffe (2010, esp. 134). In fact, this idea is stated very 
clearly by Charles Larmore in a sentence quoted by Sher (1997, 23): “Political neutrality 
consists in a constraint on what factors can be invoked to justify a political decision” 
(1987, 44). De Marneffe and Larmore focus on justification only, but these are all 
filtering approaches.
It is one thing to recognize that neutralism functions as a constraint and another to 
limit one’s understanding of neutrality to this constraint. In the two sentences following 
the one just quoted, Larmore goes on to provide part characterizations of both neu-
tral political decision and neutral political action. This may simply be meant to illustrate 
the constraint approach, but the focus on the neutrality of decisions, actions, laws and 
governments is very common. According to the constraint of reasoning approach, how-
ever, neutralism is not a criterion for neutral decisions, actions, justifications, or anything 
else. It is merely a constraint. 
In practice, of course, there will be breaches of neutrality. However, such breaches 
need not be normatively relevant. In a subjective justification process, for example, rea-
sons that should be filtered out may not be, but this need not affect the output if there are 
sufficient neutral reasons for the policy. This shows that it is not obvious how a neutralist 
should respond to breaches of neutrality. It seems very plausible that this will vary with 
context. Beyond all contexts, however, the neutralist requirement is clear: only neutral 
reasons are to enter the reasoning process. 
Interestingly, Sher himself captures the essence of neutralism as a constraint on 
reasoning when he refers to neutralism later in the book and gives it this abbreviated 
(“roughly speaking”) wording: 
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(N) Do not support any law or policy on the basis of any particular conception of the 
good life (1997, 131). 
(N) does not mention possible arguments, nor subjective notions such as ‘plausible’, 
‘obvious’ or ‘reasonable’, and it does not purport to determine which policies are neu-
tral, or neutrally justifiable. These are important advantages over (N’’). The notion of 
supporting a policy on a certain basis raises questions. For example, do I support a policy 
on the basis of a particular conception of the good life if I support it for two reasons that 
I consider independently sufficient, one of which is that the policy furthers a particular 
conception of the good life? Also, can I support a policy on the basis of a particular 
conception of the good life without believing that this is what I am doing? Questions of 
this sort can be avoided by a slight reformulation:
(N’) Exclude reasons based on any particular conception of the good life from reason-
ing about any law or policy.5
The phrase “particular conception of the good life” here serves to identify what sort of 
reasons should be filtered out by neutralism. The use of ‘life’ is traditional but actually 
misleading, since both Sher and typical neutralists mean neutralism to filter out some 
reasons that do not concern the good (human) life. Sher, though frequently using the 
‘life’ qualification, mentions one example – the US Environmental Protection Agency 
treating “the continued existence of species and habitat as intrinsic goods” (1997, 112). 
Therefore, ‘life’ should be dropped.
Sher apparently uses the term ‘particular’ instead of ‘controversial’, perhaps because 
the latter is more controversial, though Sher seems to think that controversy is in fact at 
the heart of the meaning of ‘conception of the good’ (see 1997, 41). Any more substan-
tial version of the neutralist doctrine must specify exactly what reasons are filtered out, 
whether by identifying a type of reason or rather a list of such types.6 Since there is much 
controversy here, and since Sher’s formulation does not seem to capture his own views 
very well, it is perhaps best to give this more general characterization of neutralism:
(N’’) Exclude nonneutral reasons from reasoning about any law or policy.
vI. the Who and When of neutralIty
Having argued for (N’’) over (N) and (N’), Sher goes on to discuss the application of 
neutralism along four dimensions – which agents are bound by the doctrine, at which 
political levels does it apply, for which methods of influence, and what is a conception of 
the good anyway? (1997, 28)7 I agree with Sher that the specification along the three latter 
dimensions must depend on the exact normative basis for neutrality (1997, 33-34; 37; 44). 
However, I disagree with Sher’s specification along the first dimension.
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The question is: who should be neutral? And possibly: when or in what capacity? 
The standard answer is: government agents, in their role as such. Observing an obvious 
complication with this focus on governments, Sher notes:
Individuals can influence governments in many ways. They can do so, inter alia, by 
voting for persons to represent them as legislators or in the executive branch, by 
representing others in turn, by acting in various administrative and bureaucratic capac-
ities, by trying to amend the Constitution, and by advising or lobbying persons in each 
of the other roles (1997, 29)
Sher proposes that this complication can be overcome by assuming that anyone who 
influences the government directly is bound by neutralism (presumably because they 
are part of the government), and that anyone who influences the government more 
indirectly is instead “obligated to minimize the likelihood that his government will act for 
nonneutral reasons” (30). This manoeuvre leads to two problems, which Sher does not 
address. First, the new principle is distinct from neutralism proper and so a line must be 
drawn between directly and indirectly affecting in order to determine who is governed 
by which principle. Second, an obligation to minimize nonneutrality is over-demanding, 
as all other concerns will be subordinated to this obligation. Both these problems could 
probably be avoided by appropriate reformulation. Leaving them to one side, therefore, 
there is a greater and more general problem with the focus on governments.
If neutralism proper only applies to government agents, nothing prevents non-gov-
ernment agents from intentionally bringing about nonneutral effects by political means. 
For example, voters do not violate neutrality if they vote for representatives they believe 
will promote a pious or experimental lifestyle for what the representatives believe are 
neutral reasons.8 In general, political reasoning need not be neutral in the least; it must 
only consider the constraint on the reasoning of government agents (or, according to 
Sher, on their subjective justification).
Consider also this extreme, hypothetical example: a group of powerful people man-
age to install (by democratic or nondemocratic means) a government that will promote 
a pious or experimental lifestyle. The group does so for what it sees as the good of all. 
While government agents will promote the controversial lifestyle, they will mistakenly 
believe that they are only promoting neutral values. Perhaps the powerful group has man-
aged to instil this belief, or perhaps they have chosen people for their scheme who had 
the appropriate beliefs beforehand. By their actions, the powerful group has minimized 
the likelihood that their government will act for nonneutral reasons and so they conform 
to Sher’s demand on indirect influencers. Furthermore, the government itself imple-
ments only neutrally justifiable policies, according to (N’’). More generally, no neutralist 
restrictions on government action or public political discourse have been breached. The 
whole process, however, seems far from neutral.
All of these problems can be avoided by letting neutralism apply to anyone at 
any time. Sher insists that neutralism should not be confused with the requirements of 
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certain political roles, such as that of apolice officer (1997, 30). I propose that the role of 
government agent is also a political role in this sense and that neutralism applies indepen-
dently of such roles.9 There must be some restriction of course. I propose the restriction 
should come in terms of the content of reasoning, rather than in terms of who is doing the 
reasoning. (N’’) applies to reasoning about any law or policy. Since taken literally this 
would apply to theoretical reasoning about laws and policies, (N’’) should be modified 
to apply to reasoning about what any law or policy should be, or perhaps more generally 
what any government institution should or should not do.10 This is a comprehensive 
form of neutralism. The content of reasoning could be restricted further, though the 
problems entailed by a narrow scope may then resurface. For example, Rawls (e.g. 1993; 
1997), at least primarily and for the most part, applies neutralism only to a sort of public 
reasoning about constitutional matters. Unless complemented by other political princi-
ples, this form of neutralism does not apply to voting or installing governments.
The modified (N’’) is comprehensive in another way – it applies to all sorts of 
normative reasoning about the government. Neutralists may want to restrict their doc-
trine to political reasoning, marking a distinction to, for example, prudential reasoning. 
Perhaps it is not a breach of neutrality for me to consider what some policy should be 
like in order to benefit my interests. Perhaps, even if political rather than prudential 
reasoning is sometimes required, this requirement is not one of neutrality. To keep 
this option open, this is my final formulation of neutralism, understanding political 
reasoning as impartial reasoning about what the government and its institutions should 
or should not do:
(N’’’) Exclude nonneutral reasons from political reasoning.
Neutralism as excluding reasons from political reasoning may seem, together with Sher’s 
(N), a more demanding doctrine than Rawls’ neutralism based in public reason. Raw-
ls allows that we “introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive 
doctrines”, as long as sufficient neutral reasons are forthcoming (1997, 776). On the oth-
er hand, such introduction is an act of “declaration” and not “a form of public reasoning” 
(1997, 786). It is also aimed at expressing support for fundamental principles rather than 
for particular policies (1997, 784-5). If considering politics from within a comprehensive 
doctrine is not reasoning about what the government should do, then the public role 
Rawls sees for comprehensive doctrines is consistent with (N’’’).
vII. conclusIon 
One of the virtues of Beyond Neutralism is that it opens with an ambitious and much 
needed discussion of the structure of neutralism. However, Sher’s favoured formu-
lation of neutralism has several weaknesses. It is too subjective, implying that im-
plementing sectarian policies can be consistent with neutrality if only policymakers 
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see a neutral justification that they mistakenly find sufficient. It is also restricted to 
government agents, implying that successful manipulation of the government into 
promoting controversial lifestyles can be consistent with neutrality. It is further-
more dependent on a specific theory of justification. The constraint on reasoning ac-
count of neutralism avoids all these problems. It is also in the spirit of Sher’s general 
approach and later arguments, as well as in the spirit of other important interpreta-
tions of liberal neutrality. Adopting this approach should make for a more plausi-
ble doctrine of state neutrality. Whether or not that doctrine should be accepted is 
another and more difficult matter.
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notes
1. This distinction is emphasized by Peter de Marneffe (1990). 
2. Attaching the subjective condition “seems to” first in condition (2) and (3) in (N’) would 
produce a formulation which would be as subjective as (N’’) but stronger and more precise. 
3. Sher seems to confirm his commitment to this principle in a 2003 article. 
4. Such as permissibility and requirement; see, for example, Gert (2007). 
5. This exclusion could be understood as based on an exclusionary reason, in the terminol-
ogy of Joseph Raz, in the sense that it is a good thing if excluded reasons are conformed with, 
though they should not be complied with (e.g. 1975/1990, 185). This could explain the ambiva-
lence some feel about the exclusion (cf. Raz 1975/1990, 41).  
6. See De Marneffe (2006) for an argument to the effect that nonneutral reasons lack a 
common denominator. 
7. Strictly speaking, since (N’’) concerns the neutral justifiability of policy, these dimensions 
do not specify the application of (N’’), but rather when we should be concerned with neutral 
justifiability. I will disregard this in what follows. 
8. Jeremy Waldron both reinforces the focus on government agents and indicates the pos-
sible problems when he states that neutralism applies to a person “in her capacity as legislator 
(and presumably as voter)” (1989, 70). 
9. Raz, in his discussion of neutralism, typically speaks mostly of governments and their 
actions, but, introducing this discussion, he observes “the deep-felt conviction that it is not within 
the rights of any person to use the machinery of state in order to force his conception of the good 
life on other adult persons” (1986, 111).  
10. Steven Lecce proposes that “the neutrality constraint must exclude sectarian values 
whenever citizens’ interactions with one another are mediated through state agencies, at every level” 
(2008, 233). 
A Dilemma for Perfectionism
Kirsten Meyer – Humboldt University, Germany
I. IntroductIon
Perfectionism is still a frequently discussed position in political philosophy (Wall 2010; 
Nussbaum 2011). According to a perfectionist approach to politics, it is permissible for 
state officials to favour certain ideals of the good life over others on the grounds that 
they are more worthwhile for human beings (Clarke 2006, 11; Wall 2010, 222). This 
perfectionist commitment to promoting valuable ideals also includes controversial 
ideals. Against this, liberals hold that the state should refrain from such a commitment 
to a certain conception of the good life. In their view, there is a variety of reasonable 
— 558 —
 Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 3
ethIcal perspectIves – september 2012
conceptions of the good life in a pluralist society. They hold that the state ought not to 
prefer one over the other and justify its actions with reference to a certain ideal. The aim 
of this contribution is to show that in rejecting this liberal requirement, perfectionists are 
faced with a dilemma: their position either coincides with the liberal position, or the per-
fectionist proposal to promote a certain conception of the good life cannot be justified.
II. What Is perfectIonIsm? 
With reference to ancient conceptions of the good, one might characterise perfection-
ism as the proposition that the goal of our actions should be the complete development 
of our abilities and the best performance of our activities. Thus it is assumed that our 
abilities have to be ‘perfected’. In political philosophy, such accounts of the good life are 
often called ‘perfectionism’ and its proponents refer to themselves by that term (Hurka 
1993). However, the term ‘perfectionism’ does not always designate positions that in-
deed suggest the perfection of something. Rather, it is also used to designate positions 
that transcend mere subjectivist theories of the good life. George Sher is an example in 
this regard. He characterises subjectivism as the approach that reduces everything that 
is good (for us) to our present or ideal desires, choices or enjoyments, or to a combina-
tion of all these factors. According to Sher, a perfectionist denies that this suffices: “By 
contrast, if a view denies that these factors exhaust the determinants of value, I shall call 
it a form of perfectionism” (1997, 8ff.). Sher assumes that subjectivism deals with attitudes 
that are “peculiar to individuals.” By contrast, he is concerned with “very general goals 
that characterize the human species” (1997, 198). Sher maintains that the achievement of 
our fundamental goals relies on the prior development of specific abilities. Hence, it is a 
consequence of his approach that certain abilities should be promoted, such as the ability 
to appreciate certain aesthetic values. 
With respect to the promotion of these abilities, Sher is a perfectionist in a second 
sense of the term ‘perfectionism’. The first was connected to a certain conception of the 
human good. Perfectionists in the first sense take a stance on the human good. Moreo-
ver, in the realms of political philosophy the term ‘perfectionism’ is also used to describe 
an approach that argues in favour of the promotion of the good and in contrast to the prin-
ciple of neutrality. In this case, perfectionists try to develop a theory of public action rather 
than a theory about the good life. In principle, both versions of perfectionism can stand 
apart. However, most proponents of a political perfectionism also endorse a conception 
of the good.1 This is not surprising, since it especially makes sense to generally argue in 
favour of the permissiveness to promote the good if one can think of a certain concep-
tion that should indeed be promoted. 
Perfectionists in the second sense think that the state may take a stand on what is a 
worthwhile way of life and help people lead good lives. Perfectionism thereby sees itself 
as opposed to political liberalism. However, since liberals may also claim that it is per-
missible for the state to support shared ideals of the good, Stephen Wall adds that “the 
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perfectionist commitment to promoting valuable ideals should be construed to include 
controversial ideals” (2010, 222 n.3). So the core disagreement between liberals and per-
fectionists seems to be that according to the perfectionist, the state should be allowed to 
promote the good even if there is no agreement about it. If there is no agreement about 
the good, the political liberal would demand neutrality between the different conceptions 
of the good. Perfectionists, therefore, oppose state neutrality.
What are the reasons for state neutrality the perfectionist is determined to chal-
lenge? In arguing for state neutrality, John Rawls famously pointed to the ‘fact of plural-
ism’ (1996, 24ff.; 58ff.; 216ff.). He refers to the fact that in liberal societies there is no 
universal religious, philosophical or moral conception about the good life shared equally 
by all citizens. Rawls thinks the rivalling conceptions about the good life are equally 
reasonable. He thinks that the persistence of disagreements about the good under condi-
tions of political freedom demonstrates that these disagreements are not based on iden-
tifiable mistakes. As a matter of fact, even if different persons are in possession of all rel-
evant information and would contemplate impartially, they can still reach different results 
about their allegedly reasonable conceptions about the good. This is what Rawls calls the 
‘fact of pluralism’ and thereby he emphasises the fact of a ‘reasonable’ disagreement.2
Rawls concludes that there are specific kinds of state action that must not be justi-
fied with reference to contested conceptions of the good.3 Governmental constraints 
cannot be justified if the reasoning behind these constraints includes presuppositions 
that cannot not be shared by their different, but equally reasonable, proponents (Rawls 
1996, 134ff.). Others who argue in favour of the principle of neutrality also claim that 
the assumption of reasonable pluralism is crucial. Macedo, for example, states that “the 
permanent fact of pluralism is the heart of the liberal political problem” (1990, 256; 
Larmore 1987, 50). According to these liberals, this is why the state should refrain from 
the promotion of such controversial conceptions of the good. The underlying conviction 
behind this is that legitimate governmental constraints have to be justified to all people 
who find themselves under such constraints (Dworkin 1978, 127; Larmore 1987, 59).4 
What might a perfectionist reply to this?
III. the dIlemma of perfectIonIsm
The perfectionist might attempt to show that certain conceptions of the good life are 
more reasonable than others. He or she might claim that there are in fact disputed con-
ceptions of the good, but that this dispute can in principle be solved by good arguments. 
Thereby, he or she might aim at contradicting the fact of a reasonable pluralism. He or 
she might concede that there is a factual pluralism – people are committed to different 
conceptions of the good. However, the perfectionist denies that the different concep-
tions of the good are equally reasonable. Some conceptions are better than others, or, in 
other words: we have reasons to subscribe to these conceptions of the good rather than 
others. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the perfectionist succeeds. He or 
— 560 —
 Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 3
ethIcal perspectIves – september 2012
she might indeed successfully argue that some conceptions of the good are less reason-
able than others.
By questioning the fact of pluralism, he or she questions the truth of the core 
argument for state neutrality. However, if this criticism indeed succeeds, there would 
no longer be a dissent between perfectionists and liberals. Therefore the perfectionist is 
faced with the first horn of a dilemma:
i.  If the perfectionist denies the fact of reasonable pluralism, then criticism of the 
principle of neutrality would come to nothing since the fact of pluralism is the core 
of the liberal position. 
Admittedly, one need not construe this as a horn of a dilemma, since one could simply 
describe it as a convergence of political liberalism and perfectionism. In a sense, the lack 
of disagreement is neither bad for the liberal nor bad for the perfectionist. However, it 
should be puzzling at least for those who think that there must be a point to the debate 
between political liberalism and perfectionism. If we cannot avoid the second horn of the 
dilemma, the first horn reveals that there is no such fundamental disagreement.
The second horn of the dilemma emerges if the perfectionist concedes that certain 
conceptions about the good cannot be justified to every reasonable individual. Here, the 
fact of pluralism would not be challenged and therefore the first horn of the dilemma can 
be avoided. However, if the fact of pluralism is not challenged, it remains unclear how 
the perfectionist proposal itself can be reasonably justified. Thus, he or she is faced with 
the second horn of the dilemma:
ii.  If the perfectionist accepts the fact of reasonable pluralism, he or she lacks a justi-
fication for promoting what he or she holds to be the better conception of the 
good.
Sher, for instance, claims that the state (e.g. educational institutions) should endorse the 
ability to recognise certain aesthetic values and should counteract an intellectually im-
poverished culture. The reasoning behind this seems to be that being able to aesthetically 
appreciate certain things is a condition for being able to interact well with other people. 
Thus a lack of this ability diminishes our ability to attain a whole range of our fundamen-
tal goals (Sher 1997, 213ff.). I must confess that I have doubts concerning this justifica-
tion of the promotion of certain aesthetic values.5 All the same, no matter how plausible 
the perfectionist thoughts about the good life might be, whoever criticises the principle 
of neutrality will always be caught in the aforementioned dilemma. Let us assume that 
Sher succeeded in convincing us that his position is correct: “Yes,” we all would (have to) 
say, “how well our life goes really does depend on whether or not we reach our funda-
mental goals. In order to do so we need to develop a certain kind of aesthetic sensitivity.” 
If this is the case, the perfectionist is faced with the first horn of the dilemma. In fact, 
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the perfectionist would fail to challenge the liberal position since in this case the liberal 
would no longer hold the fact of pluralism to be true. The opposition to liberalism that 
perfectionists rely on would suddenly only be a putative one. 
How weak the opposition actually is becomes apparent when we take a closer look 
at Sher’s position. Sher regards himself a perfectionist. But what is Sher arguing for? 
What exactly is his opposition to the principle of neutrality? Also, he demands justifica-
tion for state action; the following statement emphasises this: “Do not support any law 
or policy on the basis of any conception of the good that you have not scrutinized and 
found to satisfy your usual standards of justification” (1997, 131). It is Sher who com-
mits himself to this demand; he does not apply it – as one might presuppose – to the 
proponents of state neutrality. Yet, Sher’s demand is quite similar to Rawls’ position. In 
this respect, Sher’s argumentation shows that liberals and perfectionists have more in 
common than is often claimed. Liberals as well as perfectionists (at least one like Sher) 
demand justification for specific forms of state action. Rawls, however, claims that the 
usual standards of justification cannot challenge the fact of pluralism, which means that 
reasonable pluralism persists.6 Rawls emphasises that this is why reasonable people main-
tain that it is indeed unreasonable to exploit their political power in order to suppress 
conceptions of the good which differ from their own. Such behaviour cannot not be 
justified to the people that might be affected by it (Rawls 1996, 60ff.).
Now, the perfectionist might also accept that this justification does not succeed. 
He or she would claim that some people just do not want what would be good for them 
and that is why one cannot show them that they are wrong. At least one cannot do this 
if one pursues a form of subjectivism that links what is good for a person to his or her 
attitudes. Therefore, one should act according to a perfectionist (rather than subjectivist) 
conception of the good life. However, whatever this perfectionist conception may be, 
the reasoning behind it must also be comprehensible to every reasonable person. It must 
be justifiable that the alternative will make the person’s life better, independent of his or 
her experience and desires. How is that possible? For instance, we can imagine someone 
who does not do any of the meaningful things a perfectionist would recommend doing, 
but instead spends most of his or her life on the beach sunbathing (assuming that he 
or she achieved financial stability through gambling).7 How could it be justified from 
the perfectionist perspective to convince such people (by constraint or public incentive 
methods) to do more sensible things? This justification must be understandable for every 
reasonable person, including our layabouts on the beach. It must be justified to them that 
it is better for them to pursue a putatively more meaningful life.8
I doubt that this can be done. But if it could be done there is no dissent with the 
liberal position. If the perfectionist claims that it is reasonable to make contested concep-
tions of the good life the foundation of state action, the justifiability for this very same 
course of action would be missing. Alternatively, state action is justifiable to everyone, 
in which case the liberal no longer holds the fact of pluralism to be true. Ultimately, the 
perfectionist criticism is caught in a dilemma. It either coincides with the liberal position 
or fails to support a perfectionist policy on the basis of a justified conception of the good.
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Iv. escapIng the dIlemma?
Can a perfectionist accept the fact of pluralism and still escape the dilemma? Stephen 
Wall thinks that it is possible to formulate a perfectionist position without denying value 
pluralism (Wall 2010). Wall himself allows for a plurality of equally (or incommensura-
bly) valuable ideals of the good life, but he tries nevertheless to defend a perfectionist 
position. This position incorporates the following “restricted neutrality principle”:
If two or more ideals of a good human life are eligible for those who live in a par-
ticular political society, and if these ideals have adherents in that political society, and 
if these ideals cannot be ranked by reason as better or worse than one another, then 
the state, to the extent that it aims to promote the good in this political society, should 
be neutral between these ideals in its support of them (2010, 238). 
The aim of Wall’s paper is to emphasise that this principle of state neutrality is compat-
ible with a perfectionist approach to politics. Hence, perfectionists are allowed to vote 
for state neutrality – in the event of ideals that cannot be ranked by reason as better or 
worse than the other.
Wall is a perfectionist. At which point does he depart from the liberal principle of 
state neutrality? In order to emphasise the contrast, Wall explicates the liberal principle 
of state neutrality (in contrast to his perfectionist one) as follows: “It is impermissible for 
the state to intend to favor or promote any permissible ideal of a good human life over 
any other permissible ideal of a good human life, or to give greater assistance to those 
who pursue it” (2010, 239). The difference with Wall’s own proposal is that it indeed 
allows the state to favour some permissible ideals of the human good over others: the 
ones that can be reasonably ranked as better than the other. In contrast, Wall portrays 
the liberal as someone who requires state officials to refrain from an adherence to any 
conception of the good. 
However, is this really the position of the liberal? At this point, it seems that 
perfectionism gains its putative strength by portraying the proponents of the principle of 
neutrality as one-sided. Rawls, for example, avoids sticking to one particular conception 
of the good about which reasonable people might argue. If, however, Rawls emphasised 
that state action should not rely on any conception of the good life, his theory would 
lose all its strength.9 One would not be able to decide on which criterion to judge the 
improvement of life conditions: financial wealth or the highly appreciated good of self-
respect? It is correct that Rawls tries to avoid a perfectionist conception of the good life 
– a conception of which there is no reasonable agreement. The liberal does not hold that 
the state may not favour a worthwhile ideal over a worthless one, if it has reason on its 
side. Rawls would probably be very sceptical about the idea that it does have reason on 
its side if there is a real dispute over different conceptions of the good within a society. 
This scepticism is formulated in the thesis of value pluralism. The liberal emphasises that 
the majority should not decide whether or not something is unworthy. We need to be 
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extremely cautious on these matters. According to the liberal, many forms of disagreement 
between different ideals of the good life cannot be resolved by referring to reason. There-
fore, state action that promotes one of them would be an unjustified form of coercion.
The perfectionist thinks that the state should be allowed to promote the good even 
if there is no agreement about it. In order to escape the above stated dilemma, he or she 
might claim that a factual pluralism is the core of the liberal position. According to this 
reconstruction of the liberal position, an argument concerning ideals of the good might 
never be decided by state action, no matter how reasonable it is. This would indeed be a 
possible way to escape the dilemma. It would be a way for arguing in favour of the pro-
motion of a reasonable conception of the good against political liberals who state that it is 
generally forbidden to act according to a conception of the good. However, this does not 
seem to be the position of the liberal. Liberals do not simply refer to the fact that differ-
ent people have different conceptions of the good.10 The underlying conviction behind 
their position is that legitimate governmental constraints have to be justified to all people 
who find themselves under such constraints. This justification cannot be provided if 
there is a reasonable pluralism.11 At one point in his paper, Wall himself characterizes 
the liberal position in similar terms. He states that the idea behind the liberal argument 
is “that political justification […] should not rest on claims that are subject to reasonable 
disagreement” (2010, 241). However, if Wall thinks that this is the liberal position, how 
can he still be convinced that there is room for his own and allegedly different position, 
which is perfectionism?
Perfectionists and liberals alike might ask how reasonable a certain conception of 
the good is – for example, a conception based on the value of autonomy or on certain 
aesthetic values. This would be a very interesting debate on questions of the good life. It 
might turn out that the liberal withdraws from insisting on a reasonable pluralism con-
cerning a certain value, such as the value of autonomy. Let us suppose that the liberal in-
deed concedes that it is unreasonable to deny the value of autonomy or to deny its proper 
place within a conception of the good. In that event that the liberal might de facto move in 
a perfectionist direction, for example by arguing for the promotion of autonomy in the 
educational system. So there is still room for a worthwhile discussion, but it should be a 
discussion on concrete questions of the good life rather than on the general and merely 
alleged differences between political liberalism and a reasonable perfectionism.
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notes
1. See, for example, Hurka (1993) and Sher (1997). Both have perfectionist conceptions of 
the good life and both reject the principle of neutrality. 
2. For an interpretation of the term ‘reasonable’ in this context, together with a gentle cri-
tique concerning the rationalistic implications of this notion in Rawls work, see Nussbaum (2011). 
3. What Rawls has in mind here are the basic state institutions in particular.  
4. Gaus emphasises that the principle of neutrality can be grounded on the moral restraint 
of coercing people to do something that cannot be justified to them (2003, 146).  
5. For a liberal criticism concerning the state funding the arts, see Brighouse (1995).  
6. “[M]any of our most important judgements are made under conditions where it is not to 
be expected that conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will 
all arrive at the same conclusion” (Rawls 1996, 58). 
7. Sher claims, for example, that the development of an anti-cancer drug or being a good 
father gives life “meaning and worth” (1997, 177). Spending one’s life lazing on the beach is a 
lifestyle perfectionists ordinarily find very wrong.  
8. There is a difference between what reasonable people might agree is good for people and 
what we can actually convince people is good for them. If state action had to be based on the 
latter this would be a very high and probably impossible justificatory standard. For this reason, 
political liberals do not hold that state action generally has to be based on the latter. So this does 
not mark the difference between liberalism and perfectionism. 
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9. Rawls explicitly states that he interprets the principle of neutrality differently: “One I 
don’t take up is William Galston’s view that some forms of liberalism are neutral in the sense that 
they use no ideas of the good at all except ones that are purely instrumental (neutral means, as it 
were)” (1996, 191 n. 22). Galston argues that we should consider the “brute fact of difference” 
– regardless of how reasonable these different conceptions of the good are (Galston 1995, 519). 
10. Wall himself states that liberals speak of reasonable pluralism as opposed to pluralism 
as such (2010, 240 n. 18). Thereby it seems that according to Wall the adjective ‘reasonable’ does 
not denote reasonable belief in the epistemic sense. However, other interpreters do think that 
Rawls defines ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ epistemically. See, for example, Nussbaum 
(2011, 24). 
11. To be sure, the mere fact of pluralism is also relevant with regard to state neutrality as 
a means to securing social peace. Rawls himself also thinks that we need “an agreement that might 
serve the political purpose, say, of achieving peace and concord in a society characterized by 
religious and philosophical differences” (1996, 63). However, perfectionists also consider this 
instrumental reason for neutrality. See, for example, Wall: “For any particular society at any par-
ticular time, there may be various pragmatic reasons that speak against undertaking perfectionist 
political action” (2010, 233 n. 3). Again, there seems to be no deep theoretical conflict between 
liberals and perfectionists in this regard. 
Human Nature, Liberty and Equality: Sher’s Perfectionism as Anthropology
Christoph Henning – University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
I. IntroductIon
Unlike alternative perfectionist theories that adapt to the neutralist scheme and offer 
a hybrid neutralist perfectionism (Dworkin 2000, 237ff.; Jentsch 2009), George Sher’s 
book from 1997 reaches out ‘beyond neutrality’: since the human good is a matter of 
more than subjective taste it is legitimate to bring about some of these goods politically. 
In my radicalised re-reading, Sher’s theory becomes an even more objective approach with 
an egalitarian edge.1 This is achieved simply by re-reading the book backwards. Whereas 
Sher starts from the abstract issue of epistemology (chapter 6), then criticizes competing 
theories (chapters 7 and 8) and ends with the material theory (chapter 9), I will reverse 
the order from the abstract to the concrete (putting it ‘from its head to its feet’), thus 
correcting the subjectivism that creeps into two decisive arguments for a more consistent 
naturalism all the way down. Hence, I start with the axiological question: What are the 
“human goods”, and what makes them so? After dealing with the questions of relevance 
and epistemology (How can we know about these goods? And why should this approach 
be preferred to competing theories?), I will spell out the implications of my re-reading 
for liberty and equality.
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II. What Is good, and Why? sher’s foundatIonalIsm
For perfectionists, that which is good for people depends not only on their feelings, 
desires or informed desires, but also on some deeper values. Current literature, therefore, 
calls perfectionism an ‘objective’ theory.2 Sher shares this anti-subjectivist tendency when 
it comes to values: perfectionism, he says, must argue against the selective scepticism 
that is inherent in subjectivist theories of value, which treat the “actual or ideal desires, 
choices, or enjoyments” (83) of individuals as the “source of value” (164). Accordingly 
we do not desire x because it is valuable, but it is valuable because we desire it.4 Sher 
assumes that if these theories were true, the ‘neutralist’ position would be much stronger 
than it actually is. If values were valid for individuals only and not for political com-
munities, states would have fewer reasons to act for (the) good. Unlike Sher, I think the 
first question to ask is what is good, and why (Kraut 2007). An easy way to achieve an 
agreement here is to ask what is not good. Sher mentions “servility, self-abasement, and 
coarse and indelicate activities and sensibilities” (184) or “lives of ignorance, idleness, 
and depravity” (179). Even if not everybody will agree that “an endless diet of punk rock 
or sitcoms” or “images of casual sex and routine violence” (213) are part of a “boorish” 
(184) or “coarse, vulgar public culture” (212), most will agree that “sleeping in alleyways 
and trading oral sex with strangers for intervals of drug-induced euphoria are simply not 
good ways for humans to live” (179).
Putting it positively is more complicated because such judgements often remain 
formal. When Sher writes that “some ways of being really are better than others” (ix) or 
“some traits, activities, and ways of relating to people really are superior to others” (3), 
we learn that “good” does not apply to things, but to “traits and activities” (2, 198); yet 
we want to know which of these are in his “very traditional list of the elements of a good 
life” (8). Sher mentions “values of virtue, excellence, and reason” (7), “decency and good 
taste” (212), “lives of autonomy, accomplishment, virtue, and knowledge” (179), or “a 
sustained commitment to any serious project, from seeking a cure for cancer to being 
a good parent” (177, 184). Though there seem to be endless amounts of goods, Sher 
believes we may integratively “list the constituents of a good life” (200). The list is taken 
from Parfit (1984, 499) and consists of “moral goodness, rational activity, the develop-
ment of one’s abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the 
awareness of true beauty” (201).5
This leaves us with the question why these things are good. For Sher, they are good 
due to their “inherent” value (9). Unlike intrinsic values, inherent values are not good in 
themselves, but good for (in relation to) us. So they have a source in their contribution to 
our “fundamental goals” (204, 208, 216). But how do these goals transfer value? Their 
good-making property is their link to our “fundamental capacities” (209). This gives us a 
recursive chain from good activities to inherent value, from inherent value to fundamen-
tal goals, and from these to fundamental human capacities. We cannot ask any further, 
because this is just “our constitution” (239).6
Now, it is not self-evident how exactly we derive “the good life for humans” from 
“the realization of their fundamental capacities” (9). How does this work in detail? Sher 
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offers a criterion for fundamentality: “a fundamental capacity will be one whose exercise 
is both near-universal and near-inescapable” (202). He sees only three such capacities: A 
“native capacity to understand the world” (203), another for “practical activity”, and a 
third to “form and sustain social bonds” (205).7 They lead to three of the Parfitian goals 
of knowledge, rational activity (including other “autonomy-related goods” [205]), and 
“being a good parent” (which, if “generalized” [205] gives us all kinds of valuable rela-
tions).8 But what about the remaining three items on the list? We “all have the capacity 
to pursue each” (207), but they are not fundamental in Sher’s sense because we can avoid 
them. However, the goals are fundamental enough because they help to realize the three 
fundamental capacities we have. Developing an ability “would greatly increase our chanc-
es of achieving fundamental goals”, so derivatively it becomes one itself (208). Likewise, 
in order to achieve the fundamental goals of rational activity, we have to be “receptive” 
to the right reasons, which often happen to be moral (209) and, albeit to a lesser degree, 
aesthetic ones (204f.; 211). Hence, an “awareness of true beauty” and “moral goodness” 
as character traits help us to see the right reasons in order to act rightly.
III. epIstemology: agaInst subjectIvIsm
This approach is not objective in the sense of Plato or Max Scheler, who claimed that 
intrinsic values are a reality to be discovered. The objectivity lies rather in the nature of 
the subjects. They have to do certain things, thus the goals of these actions (and traits or 
relations) are objectively valuable.9 Human nature guarantees that we are not only talking 
about momentary desires or cultural particularities. But even if an objective theory of 
the good might work in theory, one might ask why anyone should prefer it to competing 
models. To show this, Sher must argue against subjectivist theories of value. Indeed, 
Sher holds that subjectivism “rests on a series of metaphors” (197) and does not “explain 
how value motivates, what makes value claims true, and how value is created” (176): 
“no adequate story has been forthcoming” (198). Astonishingly, however, the section on 
epistemology (140ff.) concludes with a subjectivist conception. How does this happen?
According to the hegemonic (albeit quite young, Sandel 1996, 274ff.) liberal nar-
rative, the political collective cannot ‘know’ about the good in a general way, since no 
rational consent about cultural ‘beliefs’ can be expected. Following Rawls’ ‘reasonable 
pluralism’, conceptions of the good are presumably shared on a local basis, applying only 
to individuals or smaller groups. They seem to emerge subjectively – from individual or 
collective subjects.10 This epistemic link between subjectivism and neutrality can already 
be found in Locke and Kant. Within this political epistemology, Sher detects three dif-
ferent arguments. The reason to reject truth claims of value statements can be based on 
(i) “a scepticism about all beliefs”, (ii) “a scepticism about all normative beliefs”, or (iii) a 
scepticism only about “particular conceptions of the good” (142f.). Sher points out that none 
of these claims can justify liberal neutrality. The first two claims simply make “no dis-
tinction between the good and the right” (149), so there is not much to gain from them 
for the liberal. Only the third claim deserves closer attention. The epistemological prin-
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ciple behind it, Sher says, is coherentism, for claims about the right are legitimized with 
reference to a presumed “reflective equilibrium” (145). But “coherentism sets no princi-
pled limits” (150) between questions of right and good – both types of belief may pass 
the test or not. If we can know something about the right, we should also be able to learn 
something about the good, and vice versa: if we did not know anything about the good it 
would be unlikely that we could know anything about the right either (144; 17).
From a common sense-perspective Sher is certainly right: nobody would make an 
epistemological difference between his or her claims about the good and the right, given 
that both of them are coherent with all other beliefs a person holds. Against the “selec-
tive scepticism” (143) of liberal philosophy, this shows nicely that knowledge about the 
good is on a par with knowledge about the right. Empirical claims about the right are 
often no less contested than those about the good (144). Moreover, there often is some 
consent about questions of the good.11
However, for Sher’s theory of value this solution poses a new problem: both claims 
are now interpreted as coherentist. The only criterion needed for a belief to pass the 
test is coherence with the other beliefs a subject has. And as coherentism depends upon 
“what the subject believes” (145; 151), knowledge about the good remains subjectivist. 
Does this not testify Against Perfectionism? Sher’s preferred epistemology is subjectivist, 
and likewise he holds against communitarian claims that the individual’s “actual desires 
or choices” (236) remain the source of value. If we only admit subjectivist and commu-
nitarian theories this seems unavoidable. But it cannot be what Sher wants. Therefore, 
I suggest a third candidate: human nature. It is already present in Sher’s book. However, 
it only shows up in later sections (201ff.), so it has no power in earlier parts. Reading 
the book backwards allows us to re-import it to where it matters most: it answers the 
value-theoretical as well as the epistemological concern.
Sher has shown that knowledge about the right is not privileged over knowledge 
about the good. Yet the question as to whether we do know anything about the good 
in a generalizable way remains open. Sher assumes that in listing central human goods 
he already answered the epistemological question: “By actually doing what I have said 
can be done, I shall try to back up my claim that that conceptions of the good pose no 
special epistemological problems” (153). But this is only half-true: Knowing something 
may answer the question whether we can know it; it does not yet answer the question how 
we can know it. Following Kant, this is the relevant epistemological question. The said 
knowledge might still be mere opinion, so a stronger epistemological backbone is called 
for. This, however, is missing. When Sher develops his “near-universal, near-unavoidable 
goals” (229), knowledge about them is taken for granted. This is possible only within 
coherentism. But that is hardly recommendable, because it tempts Sher into an anything 
goes: “From a coherentist perspective, we are never running out of things to say” (131) 
– “coherentism implies that anyone who seeks to justify a given belief has virtually unlim-
ited resources on which to draw [… he can appeal to its deductive, explanatory, probabil-
istic, or analogical relations to any of his other beliefs” (130; 201). The pressing epistemic 
question how a knowledge-claim may be substantiated unanswered.
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Moreover, it is not even an adequate description of what Sher himself does. Un-
like Rortyan postmodernists, Sher has explanatory ambitions. For example, in asking 
why something is good Sher not only re-arranges existing beliefs (the fabric of reflective 
equilibrium). He also refers to things that transcend beliefs: “empirical claims” (240), “hard 
data” (184), “facts about the world” and “about human psychology and human nature” 
(201). This leaves coherentism behind. First, once we know something is a fact, it is 
no longer a mere belief. Rather we have to adapt our (former) beliefs to the new fact.12 
Secondly, in Sher’s own theory, these facts are not just some beliefs amongst others. 
Instead, said human capacities are “fundamental” (202; 207). Coherentism has no room 
for such foundations (see 145, note 16). So Sher is no coherentist himself: his ‘belief’ that 
he follows a coherentist model is inconsistent with what he does in fact, and its implied 
subjectivism is inconsistent with his aim of an objective theory of the good. Neither does 
he have to be one: as soon as he invokes “facts” he is no longer engaged in pure ethics, but 
in an “empirical” business (241). Even Quine, Sher’s witness for coherentism in ethics, 
transcended coherentism when it came to science.13
What, then, is Sher doing? He is describing our human nature and its goals (teloi). 
Bringing to light the facts (or facticities, Heidegger) of human life has been the pro-
gramme of normative theories about human nature since Aristotle. So Sher is following 
a “well-worn path” (202). But astonishingly Sher claims not to: his reservations about 
Aristotle and neo-Aristotelians like Martha Nussbaum (225) are outspoken. Sher is 
anxious to avoid “Aristotle’s metaphysical essentialism” (19; 239f.) and rejects “meta-
physical biology” (226; citing MacIntyre 1984, 163). Here I beg to differ: Aristotelian 
theories of human nature are not necessarily metaphysical. The manner in which human 
potentialities develop depends upon cultural circumstances and individual choice. There 
is a plasticity of the potentiality and a plurality of ways to develop. Yet there remains an 
important difference to subjectivist approaches, which rely on choice only, and to com-
munitarian approaches, which rely on culture only: there is something to be actualized, 
namely the very potentiality Aristotle and Nussbaum talk about. It is not a ‘given’, but 
neither is it nothing: it is a limited range of possibilities that may or may not become 
actual, depending on choice and circumstances. Wise choices and enabling circumstances 
are so important because we want these potentialities to develop in a good way. And there 
are empirical ways to investigate the value of choices and circumstances. 
What are the implications for the theory of value? Sher’s perfectionism is an objec-
tive theory because it assumes a human nature and “species-specific goals” (198; 155). 
To explain value in terms of human nature amounts to saying that it is valuable to realize 
human capabilities. Realizing is not creating; it is a process of setting free a potential. Such 
a potential is not a fully developed entity that only needs to be ‘discovered’. Nevertheless, 
in order to make a career, say, as a solo pianist, one has to have the “native talent” (208) for 
it; it cannot simply be “invented”.14 The fact that the community does not ‘create’ values 
does not mean that the individual does. Neither is there a need to give in to the subjectiv-
ist epistemology of coherentism: claims about human nature are empirical. This gives us 
criteria to judge what is good for us in order to make our knowledge more objective. 
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To plead for a natural fallacy here would be mistaken: it would impute a dualistic 
worldview of naked things here, and unworldly moral values there. Only then would 
‘jumping’ from one world to the other be a mistake. However, empirical theories may 
observe what is good for natural beings; and since human beings are natural, this is true for 
them, too. Nevertheless, as Aristotelians like Marx or Nussbaum were well aware, we do 
not have direct access to human nature. Since it exists only as potentiality, theories about 
it have to confine themselves to an analysis of cultures in which human potentials are 
actualized in different ways. In order to compare cultures and practices we need social 
theory.15 By now we have empirically-based theories available which investigate human 
flourishing. Between Aristotle and modern social sciences there is no break, but rather a 
continuum,16 so there is no good reason to reject modern Aristotelianism in ethics.
Iv. polItIcs of lIberty and equalIty 
What if the reluctance towards human nature is not theoretical, but political? Some 
authors fear that conceptions of human nature may restrict our range of possibilities 
(a concern about liberty) or result in legitimizations of inequality (Pinker 2002, 141ff.). 
Against perfectionist conceptions, however, both fears are unsound. Once we add hu-
man nature, Sher’s perfectionism becomes even more egalitarian and more liberal. So far 
we have transferred Sher’s thoughts on human nature to earlier sections where they were 
missing. This changed his epistemology from a (subjectivist) coherentism to an (objec-
tive) correspondency theory more receptive to empirical claims, and it enriched his axiol-
ogy by giving human nature a more prominent role over and against subjectivist theories 
of value. What does this mean for ‘politics’ (which figures in the book’s title)?
John Rawls rejected perfectionism as unjust. According to the maxi-max princi-
ple, most resources would go to the most talented. Alas, there is a hidden precondition 
to this argument: perfectionism only leads to radically unequal outcomes if we assume 
that individuals are different by nature. The neutralist story of subjectivism presupposes 
natural inequality.17 Do perfectionists have to buy this? I do not think so. In Rousseau, 
Helvétius, Adam Smith or Left-Ricardians we find the opposite argument – they relied 
on natural equality. If individuals do not greatly differ in their natural abilities, elaborat-
ing what is good for people in general does not hurt individuals. On the contrary, it will 
benefit everybody. In fact, a development of individualistic traits of character depends on 
material conditions. To use the botanical metaphor (for “human nature is like a tree”, as 
J.S. Mill says): “Its flowers may be delicate, but its trunk must be robust” (Tawney 1931, 
83). In arguing that such differences cannot be attributed to nature, it ascribes equal re-
spect to every individual, regardless of his or her peculiarities. This is a precondition for 
individualization. If someone says: We are equal because we all are human, therefore we deserve 
equal conditions, this does not imply that all persons are the same. Rather, the intention is 
for all to be able to set free their own selves. There is no need to decide between equality 
and individuality here: the egalitarian scenario seeks to improve them both.
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Concerns about liberty have even more weight in current anti-perfectionism. For 
the liberal, state action that relies on conceptions of the good becomes despotic: it under-
mines individuals’ autonomy, because what is good for A may turn out to be bad for B, 
and it benefits some citizens at the cost of others. Indeed, quite recently it was argued that 
homosexuality is against human nature and should be rejected. The debate that arose be-
tween perfectionists in court (Robert George and John Finnis against Martha Nussbaum) 
could be interpreted as a fatal blow to any attempt to tie down specific conceptions of 
the good as anchored in human nature – not only because some Aristotelians proved to 
be illiberal, but also because they could not agree on the issue (Finnis and Nussbaum 
1993). Against this, a hasty liberal reflex is to reject claims about human nature alto-
gether. However, a more effective answer is to use the knowledge about human nature 
we have available. As mentioned above, to attain knowledge about the human good we 
need to turn to social theory. An empirical look at the impacts of homosexual conduct 
shows that living up to this disposition makes people much happier then repressing it and 
living lives of shame and concealment. From a scientific perspective it is a false claim that 
homosexuality is a cultural habit that is passed on and needs to be ‘cured’.18 Homosexu-
ality cannot be condemned with perfectionist arguments from human nature. If people 
flourish in homosexual relationships (and many do), there is nothing wrong with them, 
whereas some people suffer in traditional relationships which they nevertheless uphold 
due to culturalist ideas of value. There is no need to turn to neutralism in order to defend 
sexual autonomy (Yuracko 2003).
The role of social research is an important difference between perfectionism and 
neutralism. No social theory ever aimed to ‘prove’ liberalism. Liberal authors like Hayek 
or Rawls primarily argue normatively, with little reference to social theory (except highly 
idealized images of the market). This makes sense: only those who have an interest in 
regulating society need a theory of society, so liberalism can do without it. This also explains 
why perfectionism is such a complicated business; to work properly it needs a sound 
foundation in social theory.19 The strong link to social science transforms the concern 
about liberty as follows: how does the generality of social science relate to individual-
ism? Can the fear for our liberty that damages human nature’s reputation also be turned 
against the social sciences?20 
This question may be answered with regard to form or content. Social theory asks 
questions of the following form: what is a self, and what are good conditions for its 
development? But the question ‘what is a self?’ is categorically different from the ques-
tion ‘who are you?’, so the generality of those questions is no threat to individual liberty. 
With respect to content the answer is threefold. The fear that basing our knowledge about 
the good on theories of human nature may restrict individual liberty is unfounded first, 
because there are various ways, both culturally and individually, to realize these potenti-
alities; second, because no knowledge about old ways of life allows to preclude new “ex-
periments in living”, and third, because the best a political body, informed by knowledge 
about the good, can do is to “create institutions or social forms that make the favoured 
way of life possible or enable it to flourish” (Sher 1997, 61). Realizing these goods is left 
— 572 —
 Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 3
ethIcal perspectIves – september 2012
to individuals; there is no need to enforce them politically. Liberty and social sciences do 
not exclude one another.
Even if perfectionist politics do indeed impair neither liberty nor equality, this does 
not show why they are attractive. Social theories look impersonal, so another concern is 
that perfectionist politics might only benefit the collective. If such politics did not help 
individuals, it would not attract anyone, even if it did no harm.21Sher does not deal with 
these questions at length because he avoids the contested vocabulary of human nature 
as much as he can.22 However, in defining near-universal, near-unavoidable goals, even 
“a poor man’s Aristotelianism” (241) makes assumptions about human nature. How can 
he both remain faithful to liberal individualism and defend his objective claims against 
this individualist critique? Sher’s “depth requirement”, which says that “the relevant goal 
must stand in some appropriate relation to the person himself” (234), does not carry very far: 
it is already satisfied with species membership. The relevant goal must be “a goal that 
virtually no one can avoid pursuing – then questions about whether any or all of those 
persons ought to pursue it, or whether it is worthy of their pursuit, simply do not arise” 
(238). This does not tell us how far the fundamental goals can be endorsed individually 
(not simply by virtue of being an exemplar).23 So the problem remains: if we care for in-
dividualism as a form of life (as opposed to atomism as a social theory and a subjectivism 
of value), how can we exclude human nature-talk eventually overriding individualism?
This concern may be countered in two ways. First, a general potential can be 
developed in several directions. The relationship between human nature and its individual 
realization is not such that everybody is the same in the end. Earlier discourses on individ-
uality, from Erasmus to Simmel, discussed issues of style, so realizing their nature means 
something else for everybody. For a Renaissance individualist, juxtaposing individuality 
and generality would have been premature thinking, for individuality is developed and 
expressed not by fleeing generality, but by mastering it. Think of two solo pianists who 
share the same teacher. Both of them will only manage to develop their own style by 
mastering the school, not by rejecting it. Even where the talent is similar, its development 
may differ. Secondly, traditional theories did not only assume a general human nature. 
Some held that part of it is itself individual. General human nature is accompanied by 
individual assets; otherwise ‘self-realization’ would be meaningless. Charles Taylor traced 
this “expressivist” idea back to Herder, but we may also find it in Stoicism or in contem-
porary psychology.24Either way, once we take the perfectionist tradition more seriously it 
turns out to be a misunderstanding to juxtapose human nature and individuality.
To conclude: I have argued that Sher’s objectivity depends on a theory of human 
nature, otherwise the characteristics picked would not be near-unavoidable. It also de-
pends on natural equality, for otherwise the goals would not be near-universal. This 
has distributional implications: natural equality is a strong argument in favour of social 
equality.25 Once perfectionism includes anthropological arguments, individuals also gain 
a resource to oppose societal pressures: encouraging individuals to transcend particular 
communities and dominant notions of the self gives them a stronger hold than theories 
that only allow for communities or subjective tastes as sources of value.26 Sher is right 
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in stressing the individualist element in perfectionism, but he is wrong in belittling his 
own normative naturalism in questions of epistemology and value. It is more consistent 
and more effective to go all the way and base a liberal perfectionism on a sound theory 
of human nature.
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notes
1. Like Yuracko (2003, 34ff.), I think Sher remains too vague in political issues – it is a 
“loose end” (1997, 243). 
2. Parfit (1984, 493ff.) or Sumner (1996, 60ff.). 
3. All page references to 1997 Sher’s 1997 Beyond Neutrality. 
4. This utilitarian position is also shared by Nietzsche, Sartre and Habermas.  
5. Does this list capture all mentioned goods? “Civic participation” (11), for example, is 
missing; probably because it is avoidable and not endorsed by everybody. 
6. “If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned” 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §217). 
7. This does not rely on basic needs. Just “as we cannot avoid trying to understand the 
world, we also cannot avoid thinking about how to act in and upon it” (204), and “we appear to 
be essentially social creatures” (206). This resonates with traditional theories of the three faculties 
of thinking, willing, and feeling. 
8. Civic participation (see note 5) could figure under the latter two.  
9. This resembles the “generic principle” in Gewirth (1978). See Sher’s “generic aim” (205). 
10. Intersubjective values are values of a group and not universal.  
11. For example, in the aforementioned condemnation of “indecent” behaviour in public 
(1997, 112; 155). 
12. Beliefs about what I can do with my money have to adapt to the facts on my bank account, 
as beliefs about my relation to somebody have to adapt to this person’s factual feelings, etc. 
13. “Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence 
theory of truth; but a coherence theory is evidently the lot of ethics” (Quine 1979, 475). 
14. In self-realization we must first acknowledge what our potentials are and then unfold 
these potentials. That can be “strenuous” (208). But once talent and form of life meet, this can 
set free a lasting happiness.  
15. The point of Nussbaum’s approach was to allow for such well-being comparisons 
between nations.  
16. Remember that the late medial rediscovery of Aristotle contributed to the unleashing 
of modern science.  
17. Luck-egalitarians also rely on natural inequality when they call for a redistribution of 
natural rather than social (presumably ‘deserved’) inequalities. 
18. The biological metaphors undermine the allegation that homosexuality is “against nature”. 
See Sher’s moderate defence of homosexuality (216f.); on Finnis’ idea of “self-evidence” (201).  
19. Writers like Ferguson, Condorcet, Godwin, Mill, Marx, or Dewey embedded their per-
fectionism in social theory. 
20. Mead (1986, 46ff.), for example, blamed sociology for promoting a ‘permissive’ and 
degrading culture. His own approach is an example for questionable ‘liberal’ philosophies that 
have no need for social theory.  
21. Max Stirner’s similar criticism prompted Karl Marx to overwork his theory.  
22. Maybe that is why Sher wants only the “smallest … departure” from subjectivism (239). 
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23. George Simmel distinguishes between quantitative and ‘qualitative individualism’. 
24. Seneca De officiis (I, 107f.). The idea migrated further, to Karen Horney and Carl Rogers.
25. Tawney (1931, 55f.); Henning (2009). Thompson (2007) describes how this idea was 
dropped contingently. 
26. Thus Marks (2005, 118ff.) argues against Charles Taylor; cf. Whitebook (2001). 
Perfectionists, Egalitarians and Old Fogeys: Sher and Equality
Christine Sypnowich – Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
I. IntroductIon
Is perfectionism an egalitarian creed, committed to improving the flourishing of all? Or 
is perfectionism an elitist doctrine of excellence, at odds with ameliorating disadvantage? 
How perfectionism, the view that society should promote good and valuable ways of 
living, is connected with the idea of equality, is an interesting question. On the one hand, 
the socialist tradition has long conceived its critique of capitalism and its radical alterna-
tive in terms of not just eliminating economic disparities, but also improving human well-
being. On the other hand, an exclusive strain runs through perfectionism, insofar as the 
idea of promoting the good has often been understood to imply ignoring or sacrificing 
those who are poorly placed, whether by circumstance or choice, to endorse or achieve a 
life of excellence. This paper explores the problem of perfectionism and egalitarianism by 
looking at a prominent account of the perfectionist doctrine advanced by George Sher. 
I will argue that Sher’s perfectionism indicates a salutary humanism that, if not endorsing 
egalitarianism, certainly prepares the ground for such an endorsement. 
II. perfectIonIsm and socIalIsm
The concept of egalitarian perfectionism might seem peculiar to contemporary ears. This 
is because egalitarians today tend to be anti-perfectionist. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice ush-
ered in an era of neutralist egalitarianism in which treating people as equals is understood 
to mean that the state should not favour some plans of life over others, that questions 
about the good life should be relegated to the domain of private conscience (1972). Ron-
ald Dworkin’s egalitarianism shares this commitment to neutralism. For Dworkin, using 
public policy to promote lives of value would involve the state being at the mercy of the 
‘external preferences’ of intolerant bigots or snooty aesthetes who would coerce others 
to live by, or sacrifice themselves for, their creed (2000).
It is worth noting, however, that the entire nineteenth century egalitarian tradition 
had perfectionist assumptions (this discussion draws on Sypnowich 2000). A significant 
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example is the socialist aesthete William Morris, whose conception of living well shaped 
his commitment to equality.1 For him, there was no tension between perfectionism and 
egalitarianism. Much influenced by John Ruskin and the art of the Middle Ages, Morris 
looked to traditional manufacturing for an aesthetic beautiful in form, useful in prac-
tice, and fulfilling in its creation (1966e, 21; 1966a, 84). Morris came to believe that his 
aesthetic ideals were in tension with the imperatives of the capitalist economic system. 
Traditional crafts, the preservation of green spaces, respect for historical architecture, 
etc., were at risk if wealth was in the hands of the few. For Morris, the revitalization of 
the arts required society to interfere with “the privilege of private persons to destroy 
the beauty of the earth for their private advantage” (1966f, 256). Morris is often said to 
have anticipated the philosophy of Britain’s National Trust, which found its aesthetic 
aims bound up with egalitarian policy: care of England’s historic buildings required 
public stewardship, and public stewardship entailed the principle of public access to 
their beauty.
Morris perceived the connection between perfectionism and egalitarianism early 
on, but at first he construed equality merely as a means to perfection. Public ownership 
increases the likelihood of preservation, a point of view that could be endorsed by an 
aesthete uninterested in equality. However, as Morris’s ideas evolved, he came to see the 
constitutive link between egalitarianism and perfectionism. “A very inequitably divided 
material prosperity” meant that people “work as laboriously as ever they did”, but have 
“lost the solace that labour once provided”, that is, “the opportunity of expressing their 
own thoughts to their fellows by means of that very labour” (1966b, 193). Thus Morris’s 
aestheticism, “an act of rebellion against an ugly age” (Stansky 1983, 17), became a politi-
cal struggle for equality centred on the idea of well-being.
It is clear in this account that well-being is to be understood objectively, independ-
ent of people’s subjective views. In embracing the hope for “a new and higher life for 
all men” (1966c, 123), Morris supposed that one could pronounce on the kinds of lives 
people ought to live. He also assumed that the good life would not be self-evident to 
most people. Workers would not necessarily perceive the fact of their oppression or its 
effects. Inequality had so degraded human beings that their choices were bound to be 
bad; reduced to a “skinny and pitiful existence” the worker “scarcely knows how to frame 
a desire for any life much better than that which he now endures perforce” (1966d, 281).2 
Morris here identifies the problem of what is now called ‘adaptive preferences’, where 
disadvantaged persons, fatalistic about their lot, take the best they can find as the best 
that can be conceived (Cohen 1995, 254-255).
The belief in the profound connection between equality and perfection is of course 
central to the ideas of Marx, who so influenced Morris. Marx’s critique of inequality 
is also a critique of alienation and alienation is an inherently perfectionist concept. It 
refers not just to the unfairness of economic hardship, but to the distortion in values 
such hardship imposes, making implicit appeal to the idea of the proper form life should 
take. Economic inequality is wrong because it degrades human beings, robs them of dig-
nity, self-determination, the ability to develop their capacities. The term degradation is 
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illuminating, at once embodying both egalitarian and perfectionist elements. Thus it may 
be said, with a pleasing irony, that in the 1880s Morris anticipated Marx’s 1844 Manu-
scripts, not published until long after Morris’s death (Marx 1978, 74). 
Moreover, in the nineteenth century it was not just socialists who took the view that 
the community should foster worthwhile ways of living. We are so used to thinking of 
Mill in terms of a hackneyed harm principle that we overlook the perfectionist aspects of 
his thought. In On Liberty the “cultivation of individuality” emerges as society’s ultimate 
aim: “What more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it 
brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be?” (Mill 1966, 82). 
The idea that society seeks to enable individuals to live well continued to animate liberal-
ism after Mill. L.T. Hobhouse also considered the idea of a common culture to be vital 
to twentieth century liberalism when he wrote in 1911:
[…] mutual aid is no less important than mutual forbearance […] in those regions of 
truth and of ethics which constitute the matters of highest social concern (1964, 67).
Thus when early twentieth-century egalitarians married their ideal of equality to the prin-
ciple of a public responsibility for the good life, they were helping themselves to a widely 
accepted view. R.H. Tawney, for example, affirmed Morris’s evolution from aesthete to 
socialist when he argued that egalitarianism followed from perfectionist ideas about the 
state. For Tawney, a concern for “the perfecting of the individual,” should have as its 
“manifestation an outlook on society which sympathised with the attempt to bring the 
means of a good life within the reach of all” (1931, 114).
Socialists accordingly conceived their goals in terms of the constituents of flour-
ishing. In the Fabian call for a National Minimum, for example, the distribution of 
leisure counted as much as the distribution of income, since it would enable individuals to 
“nurture and express their individuality” (Webb and Hutchins 1909; Jackson 2008). Con-
sider William Beveridge, one of the architects of the British welfare state and his idea of 
a post-war ‘battle’ against the ‘giants’ of injustice; the perfectionist terms of his argument 
are striking. He refers to the amelioration of squalor and the elimination of idleness, 
rather than simply increasing income or resources. For Beveridge, the new commitment 
to the state provision of social welfare involved the aim of elevating human fulfilment, 
capacities and character (1943).
In sum, egalitarian aims are not necessarily at odds with perfectionism; until Rawls’ 
theory of justice, arguments for equality took for granted the idea that the political com-
munity would seek to promote the good. The task of the equal society, for theorists 
of social justice from Morris, Marx and Mill, to Tawney and the architects of the Brit-
ish welfare state, was to remedy both economic and cultural disadvantage. Remedying 
disadvantage was not merely a matter of material improvement, but also of enabling the 
living of valuable and worthwhile lives. Thus egalitarianism is compatible with perfec-
tionism; it remains to consider what egalitarian prospects there are within perfectionism 
itself.
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III. contemporary perfectIonIsts and the problem of equalIty
Egalitarianism is compatible with perfectionism, but perfectionism need not be egalitar-
ian. There is, after all, another equally prominent strain of perfectionism that is, if any-
thing, anti-egalitarian. This is the tradition of Nietzsche. The socialist argument notwith-
standing, this conception of perfectionism is the one that is perhaps best known and that 
probably served to ward off contemporary liberals from the idea of the state promoting 
the good. For if, as Nietzsche believed, perfection should take priority, then the task of 
the political community is to enable great achievements for the gifted, rather than extend-
ing better well-being to the many. As Nietzsche put it, superman should be promoted 
over the herd. “The herd is a means, no more!” he famously announced (1968, 766). 
Where do contemporary perfectionists stand on what might be termed the 
Nietzsche/Marx divide on the question of perfectionism and equality? Perfectionists 
today vary in their position on equality. Putting to one side avowed conservatives, per-
fectionists typically do not argue against equality. Joseph Raz stands out as a perfectionist 
who considers the problem of equality at some length only to reject it. For Raz, egalitari-
anism can have anti-perfectionist consequences that diminish the good of the less disad-
vantaged and thereby the overall good of society. This is because strict equality requires 
that the political community should prefer an equal distribution, in which all have little, 
over an uneven distribution, in which only a few have little but most have more. None-
theless, Raz makes it clear that this conceptual point means that we should attend to, 
not give up on, problems of disadvantage and poverty. Raz contends that his argument 
points to a prioritarian conception of distributive justice, which targets the badly off 
rather than aiming for a levelling of distributive shares (1986, chapter 9).
Of all contemporary perfectionists, George Sher might seem the least promising for 
egalitarians insofar as he does not even consider equality in his argument for the state’s 
role in promoting the good. Sher makes an excellent case for rejecting the neutralism 
of contemporary liberals in which he considers many of the grounds neutralists adduce 
for their views, arguing that neutralism need not follow from such grounds. In particu-
lar, Sher notes that a perfectionist view can give scope to autonomy and to democratic 
decision-making. However, it is striking that Sher says little about the relevance of his 
perfectionist account to the egalitarian principles that motivate many liberal neutralists. 
After all, liberals such as Rawls and Dworkin argue against perfectionist accounts of the 
state not just because of the potential for paternalism, but also because they consider 
promoting the good to be inegalitarian, showing preference for some plans of life, and 
thus some citizens, over others. Thus they contend that the metric of distributive justice 
should be all-purpose primary goods or resources, means for the realisation of any plan 
of life. Dworkin in particular invokes the principle of equal concern and respect for per-
sons as prohibiting the community from taking into account questions about how ‘others 
should live their lives’; perfectionists violate the ‘right to moral independence’ central to 
liberalism (1985, 364).
Sher does tackle Dworkin’s view that neutrality uniquely treats people as equals, 
noting that whilst this line of reasoning certainly rules out bigoted preferences, it does 
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not provide a general defence of neutrality. However, Sher explicitly states he will not 
discuss Dworkin’s conception of equality of resources, given, he claims, its irrelevance 
to Dworkin’s arguments against perfectionism (1997, 94). Thus Sher’s case against egali-
tarian liberals is oddly silent on the questions of distributive justice that undergird their 
neutralist views. However, Sher does take up questions of ameliorating disadvantage 
elsewhere. In a 1975 essay, Sher argued that if the point of affirmative action was to 
“compensate for competitive disadvantages caused by past discrimination,” then certain 
disadvantaged groups, such as black Americans, could claim to suffer from a “poverty 
syndrome” which qualified them for compensation (1975, 167-168). Sher seems particu-
larly interested in the consequences of discrimination for distributive justice: women, 
whose disadvantage as a result of sexist stereotypes cannot be described, he argues, as 
being trapped in a cycle of poverty such as that which besets black Americans, are not ap-
propriate candidates for the benefits of affirmative action. Yet although Sher grants the 
general plausibility of a defence of affirmative action on grounds of distributive justice, 
he ultimately remains sceptical of the policy’s grounding. The degree of disadvantage 
and its effect on one’s candidacy for good positions is hard to calculate. Moreover, Sher 
notes that it is one thing to appoint someone to a position because of their demonstrated 
achievements, quite another to base an appointment on what might have been achieved; 
we see fit to reward a person “who actually has laboured long and hard” to achieve success 
as opposed to one who “would have” under different conditions (1975, 166-167; italics 
original). In contrast to some radical egalitarians, it would seem that Sher does not permit 
failures in motivation and enterprise to be excused as the consequence of social injustice. 
Interestingly, in another recent essay Sher addresses head-on a prominent theory 
of egalitarian justice, namely luck egalitarianism and its project of distinguishing between 
economic hardship that is the result of choice, for which individuals should be respon-
sible, and economic hardship that is the result of luck, for which individuals should be 
compensated. He argues that it is often the case that “agents seem responsible for the 
disadvantageous consequences of their acts despite the fact that they failed to anticipate, 
and thus were not in a position to exercise control over, those disadvantageous conse-
quences.” This does not mean that luck egalitarianism should be rejected; as far as Sher is 
concerned, “if we are going to be egalitarians at all, then a luck egalitarianism is the best 
kind of egalitarian to be” (2010, 232). Nonetheless, it would appear that as far as Sher is 
concerned, luck egalitarianism in some ways reveals the weakness of the egalitarian ideal 
more generally. Sher contends that it is often just for individuals to live with the conse-
quences of their behaviour; equality should not trump other considerations. We might 
still mitigate “the richly deserved effects of people’s folly,” but we need not “wheel in 
the heavy machinery of justice” to do so. Equality is not required; an appeal to charity or 
humanity will do the job (2010, 232).
My aim here is not to assess the merits of these arguments about distributive justice 
and desert, but rather to consider their significance for our question of how perfection-
ism might generate a distinctive egalitarian position. Certainly, the perfectionist influ-
ences on Sher’s approach to these questions of social justice are apparent. In particular, 
his emphasis on the project of inculcating virtues of responsibility and self-discipline, 
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and the idea that individuals should strive to develop themselves, to succeed and ad-
vance, can all be attributed to a perfectionist outlook that seeks to improve persons. The 
remedy of inequality seems to take second place to those perfectionist goals. Desert in 
particular looms as a major consideration in distributing benefits and burdens. Those 
whose disadvantage is the result of imprudent or short-sighted choices are not neces-
sarily abandoned to a life of destitution, but it may be outside the purview of justice to 
attend to their plight. Indeed, Sher’s position suggests that the virtues are again crucial, 
as it is the qualities of beneficence and charity that are called upon to look after our less 
fortunate fellows, rather than according to them what is theirs by right, as proponents of 
egalitarian justice will insist. Sher’s discussion here leaves us with the persisting sense that 
egalitarianism and perfectionism are uneasy bedfellows. 
Iv. communIty, equalIty and value
Marx’s egalitarianism was bound up with a conception of the commonweal, where mem-
bers of the community contributed what they could and took what they needed from a 
common store of resources, thus presupposing a society based on relations of reciprocity 
and solidarity. Given the strong presence of community in many perfectionist accounts, 
it may be communitarianism that yields the best prospects for an egalitarian view derived 
from contemporary perfectionism. Certainly many perfectionists might be thought to be 
communitarians in a loose sense, concerned with the public good, delineating a common 
conception of value that improves the lives of a community’s members and arguing that 
we should build communities on the basis of this conception. Thomas Hurka speaks 
of policies that lead to “richer, more vital societies” and the “general, cultural loss” that 
comes from some talents not being developed (1993, 168). William Galston speaks of 
“public morality” and “public” or “liberal” virtues (1991, 289). For his part, Sher decries 
a “coarse and vulgar public culture” (1997, 212). 
The positions of these perfectionists differ, however, on the question of the relation 
of the public good or culture to the well-being of individuals and their material situations. 
For some, an egalitarian community is a vehicle for the promotion of excellence. This 
has been the view of some aesthetes who look to the modern welfare state to preserve 
historic artefacts – something like this view underlay, after all, Morris’s early interest in 
socialism. Hurka, for example, suggests that egalitarian policy is of interest insofar as it 
serves the more fundamental goals of perfectionism; perfectionism has a “strong but 
defeasible tendency to favour material equality” (1993, 189). 
Galston in particular seems firmly planted in the instrumentalist camp; the per-
fection in which he is interested is that of the community; the good of individuals is a 
means to that goal. His concern is for the kinds of virtues needed to sustain a liberal 
society: society must inculcate virtues of loyalty and tolerance in order for the liberal 
state to be stable and secure. Galston’s view is that a conception of equality “is needed 
to move from the individual good to public institutions and policies” (1991, 192). There 
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is a strong strain of patriotism here, where the individual has an obligation to inculcate 
certain virtues, not principally for the direct contribution such virtues make to his or her 
well-being, but in order to sustain the state that is in some sense an end in itself. For other 
communitarians, such as Michael Sandel (1982) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), individu-
als are social beings, whose identity is bound up with that of their community.
Sher takes issue with communitarianism’s perfectionist credentials, arguing that it 
offers an unreliable account of value to combat neutralism: “society’s involvement in 
the self has no clear implications about the good” (1997, 156). The “sociological com-
monplace” that individuals are shaped by society does not tell us what kind of individuals 
we should be, moreover, if we could be those kinds of individuals in more individualistic 
societies, then the communitarian causal account falls apart (1997, 160-161). For Sher, 
communitarian accounts of the person are not able to discredit subjectivism about value. 
For if, as the perfectionist claims, the good exists independent of choice, this is not fur-
thered by the idea that our choices are shaped by communities. Values must be independ-
ent “both of preferences and choices and of the society that furnishes the choice-agenda” 
(1997, 165).
In sum, community has an ambiguous relation to both perfectionism and egalitari-
anism. Sher debunks assumptions about communitarianism’s fit with perfectionism on a 
number of fronts. First, it seems contingent that the social genesis of the self will inevi-
tably direct the self to the good. Second, some communitarian accounts are motivated 
by patriotism or a commitment to some supra-individual good. Moreover, the idea that 
the individual’s good is instrumental to the good of society, bodes ill for an egalitarian 
approach that focuses on the distribution of individual flourishing. Crucial for any hope 
that perfectionism will yield an egalitarian position is that the doctrine’s focus is on hu-
man well-being as opposed to achievement or excellence per se.
v. excellence and flourIshIng
Sher’s account of perfectionism takes as its focus the objective well-being of persons. 
He avoids the dubious strategy of a social conduit to the good and instead zeroes in on 
the question of the good itself, which of course nonetheless requires social institutions 
for its genesis and support. If a public culture is “crude, one-sided, or distorted, then our 
ability to recognize what goes on within and among people will be crude, one-sided, or 
distorted, too. And this cannot but diminish our ability to attain a whole range of funda-
mental goals” (1997, 213-4). Further, Sher argues that perfectionists need not couch their 
theories in terms of impersonal value. Instead, the perfectionist can say – “in the manner 
of Aristotle himself – that knowledgeable, excellent and virtuous lives are good precisely 
for persons” (1997, 195; italics original).
Of course, by noting the role of well-being the perfectionist cannot mean mere 
satisfaction, desire/preference-fulfilment, or even happiness. What is at issue in a perfec-
tionist account is human flourishing in some objective sense, separate from, and often 
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at odds with, the matter of mere gratification. Sher contends, moreover, that objective 
values are at best contingently related to human inclinations. Although beneficence or 
justice in individuals obviously increases human happiness – and here presumably he 
means overall happiness rather than the happiness of the agents displaying these virtues 
– whether or not objective values, such as aesthetic appreciation or intellectual develop-
ment that have no clear relation to human preferences, contribute to individual content-
ment is “hopelessly obscure.” Sher might be unduly pessimistic here: recent happiness 
studies suggest that individuals in fact register greater happiness when they are engaged 
in worthwhile things – e.g. friendships, physical exercise, contributions to the community 
(Gilbert 2007; Nettle 2006; Layard 2005). Nonetheless, the perfectionist will argue that 
even if the good does happen to line up with our preferences or satisfaction, it is not de-
rived from these subjective criteria. Indeed, perfectionists might want to venture a more 
ambitious argument and suggest that the explanation goes in the opposite direction: we 
feel good because we are doing good things, rather than the good being derived from 
how we feel about it. 
It remains that perfectionists can certainly take an interest in subjectivity, however 
much they disavow subjectivism about value. Sher’s account of perfectionism is particu-
larly person-centred. He parts company with those perfectionists who “equate the good 
with excellence or perfection itself” (1997, 10), opting for a conception of inherent value, 
where human beings’ fundamental activities are enabled by certain human capacities. 
Following Parfit, he lists moral goodness, rational activity, developing one’s abilities, 
knowledge and the awareness of beauty as capacities that equip us to achieve our ba-
sic goals in life (Sher 1997, 201; Parfit 1984, appendix 1). These human capacities are 
fundamental in the sense they are universal and inescapable, and the activities or traits 
that exercise these capacities are thus inherently valuable. The human-centred nature of 
Sher’s perfectionism is underscored, too, by the centrality of interpersonal relations that, 
he argues, enable companionship and love as well as mutual recognition and thereby 
personal identity (1997, 202-206). Finally, personal contentment, though not a barometer 
of all value, is of value itself. It is an important feature of flourishing, since freely chosen 
objectively valuable pursuits are inadequate sources of well-being if the person derives 
no pleasure or fulfilment from them. As Sher puts it, “we can hardly deny that happiness, 
pleasure, and enjoyment are among life’s goods” (1997, 229). Thus we should avoid an 
austere version of perfectionism in which, as Hurka argues, pleasure figures only as “an 
accretion” relevant only insofar as worthy pursuits tend to produce it (1993, 26).
However, the focus on individuals living excellent lives, the heart of what we might 
call Sher’s ‘individualist perfectionism’, may not help answer the egalitarian question. 
Though individualised, the matter of flourishing does not speak to the distribution of 
excellence, that it be equally or widely available. It might be argued that though Sher’s 
individualist perfectionism is wisely sceptical of the capacity of ‘the social’ to generate 
individual excellence, and moreover insists on a human-centred account of the good, it 
risks being insufficiently attentive to the social in the sense of distribution, how widely 
individual excellence is shared.
— 583 —
Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 3
reactIons & debate
vI. the old fogey problem
Thus far we have noted the propitious features of Sher’s perfectionism for an egalitar-
ian view. First, it locates value not in the deliverances of the community, but in what 
is truly good for persons. Second, its humanist approach focuses on universal goals, 
including pleasure and happiness, thereby suggesting a metric of human well-being suit-
able for egalitarian aims. Sher’s humanist approach also rules out certain discriminatory, 
majoritarian judgements about what counts as valuable. Sher notes how anti-gay views 
on the part of some perfectionists tend to be derived from claims that homosexual sex 
is indecent, promiscuous or unnatural. For Sher, perfectionists have reason to be criti-
cal of promiscuity and indecency: impersonal and ostentatious coupling hampers one’s 
ability to share one’s self with others in a private, selective way that uniquely furthers 
human well-being. Sexual activity can be judged on that basis, in accordance with what 
he regards is a universal human aim. But heterosexual coupling can be indecent and pro-
miscuous too, and in such cases is no less problematic. 
Sher concedes the legitimacy of the charge that homosexuality is less natural than 
heterosexuality, insofar as reproduction is a natural function that homosexual sex cannot 
fulfil. But Sher’s criteria for the valuable, recall, invokes the concept of universality, and it 
is obvious that reproduction is not a universal aim for people, whatever their sexual ori-
entation. Moreover, Sher notes, strictly speaking the goal of reproduction is sought, not 
by persons, but by organs that belong to persons. If perfectionism holds that it is inher-
ently good that persons achieve their fundamental goals, then the fact that homosexual-
ity does not further the goal of reproduction does not exclude it from the perfectionist 
framework (1997, 218). The focus on universal capacities in the argument about sexual 
orientation is explicitly inclusive, and opens the way to understanding Sher’s perfection-
ism as pointing to, not just a delineation of the valuable, but also a concept of social 
justice in which all individuals are entitled to live valuable lives. Thus it can be inferred 
from Sher’s individualist perfectionism, even if he himself does not infer it, that it is the 
task of the political community to mitigate disadvantage that reduces people’s capacities 
to live valuable lives in the pursuit of fundamental goals.
It might be objected that the prospects for egalitarianism in Sher’s account are 
nonetheless blighted by some casual remarks he makes about what counts as the good 
and what does not. Sher’s remarks are likely to confirm populist suspicions that perfec-
tionists are dyed-in-the-wool conservatives, hostile to popular culture and insistent on 
the singular source of value in highbrow art forms. Consider:
When critics deplore the coarseness of our culture […] they say – and I agree – that 
an endless diet of punk rock and sitcoms leaves one ill-equipped to appreciate the 
music of a Mozart or the prose of a Jane Austen (1997, 213).
Sher shows his hand more recently in his challenge to luck egalitarianism with the 
example of a much-tattooed young woman whose imprudent choices limit her options in 
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the job market to “minimum wage jobs in coffee houses and low-end bars” (2010, 221). 
Sher’s words indicate what we might call the ‘old fogey’ problem with perfection-
ism, whereby an old-fashioned, snobbish, or elitist conception of taste or value seems to 
be inherent in the perfectionist idea of the good. Critics of perfectionism have certainly 
played up this stereotype. Dworkin, for one, offers examples of expensive tastes such as 
plovers eggs and champagne, or even of ‘inherently more worthy’ uses of social resources 
like books and opera; if expensive tastes are satisfied, or so-called worthy activities given 
priority, this would, he insists, be contrary to the liberal principle of treating people as 
equals (1985, 191-198). But is the old fogey anti-egalitarian? Perfectionists of the fogey 
stripe might be thought to harbour prejudices about certain kinds of people, assigning 
them less regard or respect. However, this need not follow. The essence of the fogey 
view is a disapprobation of certain values and ways of life and a respect and esteem for 
other, contrasting ones. The old fogey can respond that ultimately his or her aim is that 
as many people as possible disavow the bad and avow the good, rather than preserving 
the good for the privileged and well-off. 
Indeed, the fogey view can find support in some egalitarian views. For example, 
Amartya Sen’s egalitarianism targets particular fundamental capabilities as the metric for 
equality. Sen argues that the strategies of egalitarians such as Rawls or Dworkin, which 
focus on equitable shares of goods, fail to account for the fact that “what goods do for 
people” is subject to enormous variation because of differing circumstances in how peo-
ple live (1999, 88-9). Sen’s answer to ‘equality of what?’ is therefore not goods or prefer-
ences for goods, but ‘functionings’ or capabilities to achieve functionings, which can vary 
from such elementary things as ‘being adequately nourished’ to more complex achieve-
ments such as “taking part in the life of the community” (Sen 1992, 39), a view amplified 
by Martha Nussbaum (1984). Indeed, it may be that improvements in well-being derived 
from cultural, aesthetic and social pursuits are more important than improvements in 
physical well-being, once a threshold of some kind has been met (Griffin 1986, 52-53).
Beyond some general guidelines, what counts as capabilities will of course be sub-
ject to lively debate, among fogeys, philistines and aesthetes, but also among economists, 
and conservatives, liberals and social democrats, to name a few. The perfectionist society, 
however, will nonetheless aim to inculcate an appreciation for the worthwhile and the 
valuable, to forge some kind of common understanding of what constitutes the good. 
Moreover, egalitarian perfectionists are likely to be pluralists about the good, assigning 
inherent value, as Sher says, to a “variety of traits, activities and the like” (1997, 218). 
Taking up Mill’s call for liberal toleration of human diversity, Sher claims that “the poli-
cies we end up favouring […] leave ample room for ‘experiments in living’” (1997, 138). 
Choice has value because the individual is in the best position to make good decisions as 
to how his or her life should go, and because the ability to direct one’s life is an essential 
feature of one’s self-respect and dignity. For Thomas Scanlon, some are ill-prepared to 
make choices and thus society should tackle the context in which choices are made, to 
ensure that we ‘do enough’ for choice-makers to ensure their choices have value (1996, 
73-8, 84).
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Sher also notes that perfectionism is to be expressed in public policy that is forged 
by democratic citizens. Any adequate perfectionist alternative to neutralism must affirm 
the principle: “do not support any law or policy on the basis of any conception of the 
good that you have not scrutinized and found to satisfy your usual standards of justifica-
tion” (1997, 131). This principle is not about truth, but about the politics of approximat-
ing truth, and how best to design a society that seeks the truth about value in a democratic 
setting. This means that “a high premium is put on open discussion and unfettered sci-
entific investigation,” as well as “freedom of thought and expression” (1997, 138; 2003).
A society based on these principles need not be close-minded about the cultural 
contributions of punk rock or the aesthetic of tattoos. What counts as the valuable need 
not be set in stone by a particular generation or sensibility. Thus it is Sher’s conceptual 
approach, rather than his particular predilections about popular culture, that are funda-
mental to his individualistic perfectionism. Moreover, it should be noted that Sher holds 
that outright prohibition should be avoided:
[B]efore any government uses force to encourage the better or suppress the worse, it 
must ask both how successful the effort is likely to be and whether any expected gains 
are important enough to warrant overriding the general presumption in favour of 
liberty and non-interference (1997, 71).
Much liberal anxiety about the potential for anti-individualism in perfectionist theories 
stems from a failure to appreciate perfectionism’s potential to serve individualistic purpos-
es, once it is properly construed as a precondition for the improvement of human flourish-
ing and the fair allocation of opportunities for flourishing. A society of tolerance, aesthetic 
appreciation, civility, clean air and good health, is a society in which individuals are more 
likely to flourish. In an egalitarian theory of the public good, the community must offer 
public goods that improve individuals’ lives; what is shared or is public of the public good 
is not just a conception of its ideals, but the actual enjoyment of its pursuits. Raz sums it 
up well: “It is a public good, and inherently so, that this society is a tolerant society, that 
it is an educated society, that it is infused with a respect for human beings, etc. Living in a 
society with these characteristics is generally of benefit to individuals” (1987, 199).
vII. conclusIon
The present contribution has argued that although liberal neutralists have egalitarian 
arguments for eschewing perfectionism, and although there is within the perfectionist 
tradition a hostility or indifference to equality, perfectionism can generate a concern for 
equality. Certainly before Rawls there was a longstanding egalitarian tradition, derived 
from Marx, which sought to enable equal human flourishing, in which perfectionism and 
egalitarianism were one. Moreover, Sher’s individualistic perfectionism is an auspicious 
basis for a distinctive egalitarian approach.
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Whether Sher himself would be sympathetic to these conclusions remains to be 
seen. He has interested himself in questions of social justice, but largely to express scep-
ticism about prominent egalitarian views, such as affirmative action or luck egalitarian-
ism. And he has been explicit that equality should not trump other values. But Sher’s 
scepticism is not after all directed at the principle of ameliorating unjust disadvantage. 
Rather, it is directed at how that amelioration is to be understood and developed – to 
that extent his scepticism is salutary and instructive. For Sher’s misgivings reflect, in large 
part, his conception of value, his ideal of a well-lived human life, one of achievement, re-
sponsibility, healthy human relationships, the development of one’s rational and creative 
capacities. Thus there emerges an egalitarian ideal of human flourishing that can counter 
the instrumental approach of much contemporary egalitarianism, which seeks only to 
provide people with more equal means to pursue their goals, whatever the goals may be, 
taking no interest in how people should live.
Many egalitarians might not agree with the hard line Sher advocates on questions 
of blame, desert and responsibility. For example, Sher contends that it is important that 
all of us, advantaged and disadvantaged, prudent and foolish, be capable of blame even 
if it has “no impact on the quality of our experience”. Without blame, there will remain 
a gap between the way we live and the way we have reason to live (2006, 134-135). 
Egalitarians might be concerned that questions of desert loom particularly large in Sher’s 
account, overtaking even the option/choice criteria of luck egalitarianism with which to 
determine who is eligible for the remedy of their disadvantage. Sher’s concern for char-
acter suggests, perhaps, a particularly harsh criterion with which to constrain egalitarian 
redistribution.
Sher’s concern, however, could have quite a different impact, enriching egalitarian-
ism and raising the ambitions of equal distribution. I have in mind an ‘egalitarian perfec-
tionism’ in which the egalitarian society’s metric of distribution refers to a conception of 
human dignity, the capacity and practice of living a moral life (Sypnowich 2005; 2000). 
Thus questions of desert would figure as ways of delineating capacities that an egalitarian 
society seeks to develop and inculcate. For it might be argued that feeling deserving of 
resources – which comes from being productive – is constitutive of well-being just as 
resources themselves are. Not being hungry, of course, is a more important source of 
well-being than feeling deserving of food! Yet getting and feeling that one has earned 
what one is getting is better than just getting. Thus there are well-being grounds for a 
community to be wary of simply picking up the tab for bad choices. Individuals will not 
learn how to make good choices, they will be reluctant to choose goods that require 
deferral of gratification, and they will not learn the virtues of reciprocity and responsi-
bility. The well-being conception indicates the importance of providing conditions that 
enhance choice-making capacity, and this may involve holding individuals responsible, to 
some extent, for their choices.
In his trenchant critique of liberal neutralism, Sher did not place much emphasis 
on the theories of distributive justice that underlie many arguments for state agnosti-
cism about the good. He thus did not address the egalitarian or inegalitarian potential 
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of his own perfectionist views. I hope to have suggested a remedy for this lacuna here. 
Treating people as equals should involve enabling them to live well, and thus perfection-
ism should be restored to the egalitarian project. Moreover, in the contemporary milieu, 
where degraded ways of living tend to accompany disadvantage, perfectionism would do 
well to have its argument amplified by egalitarian concerns. Arguments such as those of 
Sher about the nature of value and the responsibility of political communities to promote 
it are important for wider debates in political philosophy. Enabling more people to live 
well is a task that cries out for the philosophical collaboration of a range of critics of 
contemporary society, be they fogeys or radicals.
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notes
1. Something bourgeois enthusiasts of Morris’s contribution to drawing-room decor are 
usually unaware of, or at pains to ignore. Since the days of New Labour, it might be said that the 
British Left, too, looks as if it is inspired more by Morris wallpapers than Morrisian socialism! 
2. The inhabitants of Nowhere in Morris’s utopian novel also lament that “the once-poor 
had such a feeble conception of the real pleasure of life” (1984, 121). 
Perfectionism and Equality: Further Thoughts
George Sher – Rice University, USA
I. IntroductIon
In my book Beyond Neutrality (1997) I mentioned, without resolving, two questions about 
which perfectionists disagree. Of these questions, the first is whether perfectionism 
is best understood as a theory about what is good for persons or about what is good 
simpliciter, while the second is whether perfectionists should be egalitarians or inegalitar-
ians. Although they appear in different parts of the book, I now think these questions are 
connected at a deep level. In the first section of this paper, I will discuss the questions 
separately. In the second, I will explain what I take to be the connection between them. 
In the third and final section, I will bring these observations to bear on the version of 
perfectionism that I defended in Beyond Neutrality, and will connect them to what two of 
the other contributors to the present volume have written.
II. tWo questIons about perfectIonIsm
Although the claims that something is good and that it is good for someone sound simi-
lar, they differ greatly in meaning and resonance. To say that a thing is good for someone 
is to assert that its existence or their having it constitutes a benefit for them, is in their 
interest, makes them better off, contributes to their well-being, or is conducive to their 
flourishing. By contrast, to say that something is good simpliciter is to maintain that its 
existence is to be prized, that we all have reason to promote or protect it, or that it makes 
the world a better place.
Even within each general heading, the cited formulations are not all equivalent. The 
vocabulary of interest is very different from that of flourishing, and assertions about 
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what we have reason to do are considerably less grandiose than claims about the world’s 
overall goodness. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that each cluster of formulations 
represents a familiar and easily recognizable approach to value. Moreover, although each 
approach has had proponents who view the alternative as unintelligible or incoherent,1 
the more common view appears to be that they are both intelligible but simply express 
different concepts. To anyone who holds the latter view, the thesis of perfectionism will 
itself be capable of taking two distinct forms.
In Beyond Neutrality, I defined perfectionism as the view that certain (types of) activi-
ties, traits, and relationships are in some sense good for reasons that are independent of 
anyone’s actual or possible desires, choices, or affective states. Here, by contrast, I want 
to expand the definition’s scope. To avoid begging any questions, I will allow that the 
bearers of perfectionist value can include not only activities, traits, and relationships, but 
also such further items as excellent athletic and musical performances, superior literary 
and artistic works, and great intellectual achievements. When the expanded definition 
is combined with our first value-notion, it yields a version of perfectionism which as-
serts that human beings are better off, or achieve higher levels of well-being, benefit, or 
flourishing, when, or to the degree that, things of the relevant sorts exist or play some 
appropriate role in their lives. By contrast, when the expanded definition is combined 
with our second value-notion, it yields a version of perfectionism which asserts either 
that it is impersonally good that things of the relevant sorts exist or play an appropriate 
role in people’s lives, or else that we all have reason to promote or preserve situations in 
which they do. Although both versions of perfectionism can be person-centred in the 
sense of attributing value to traits, activities, and relationships of persons, only the first is 
person-centred in the more fundamental sense of taking the relevant form of value to be 
goodness for persons.
Bearing this in mind, let us turn next to our second question, which concerns not 
the content or nature of perfectionism, but its distributive implications. Broadly put, 
the question here is whether a perfectionist should be an egalitarian or an inegalitarian. 
Because there are many ways of deviating from equality, there are of course many forms 
that an inegalitarian version of perfectionism could take. In what follows, however, I will 
ignore the differences among these and simply ask whether any of them is preferable to 
its egalitarian counterpart.
Because equality and inequality are competing views about how goods should 
be distributed, the first thing we need to know here is which goods are in question. 
Although philosophers notoriously disagree about what Gerald Cohen has called “the 
currency of distributive justice” (1989) – some leading contenders for this status are 
welfare, resources, opportunities, and capabilities – these debates are not directly relevant 
to our concerns. Instead, because perfectionism singles out certain things as goods, the 
most urgent distributive questions that it raises concern the allocation of these goods 
themselves. We can ask, for example, whether what matters is only how much knowledge 
or virtue or excellence the world contains, or whether it also matters that these goods be 
distributed widely rather than restricted to a few.
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One further complication warrants brief mention. As I noted in Beyond Neutrality, 
the term ‘perfectionism’ can be used to designate both a class of views within value 
theory – these have been our focus so far here – and a thesis of political philosophy. 
Because the latter thesis asserts that governments may legitimately base their actions on 
perfectionist values, it presupposes, but goes beyond, a perfectionist theory of value. This 
ambiguity allows us to distinguish two versions of the claim that perfectionists should 
be egalitarians, one axiological and the other deontological. In its axiological version, 
the egalitarian claim asserts that the equal distribution of perfectionist goods is itself a 
(perfectionist?) good, while in its deontological version, it asserts that government must 
attempt to bring such a distribution about. Because the most pressing debates about 
equality are those that take place within political philosophy, it seems safe to assume that 
the claim’s more important version is its deontological one.
III. hoW the questIons are related
Because the possible answers to our two questions cut across each other, it is not incon-
sistent to combine either version of perfectionism with either view about how its goods 
should be distributed. However, although all four permutations are theoretically possible, 
they are not all equally plausible. On the one hand, if we understand a perfectionist theo-
ry of value as a view about what is good for persons, then we will have reason to favour 
the equal distribution of its goods. On the other, if we take a perfectionist theory of value 
to be a view about what is good simpliciter, then we will at least sometimes have reason 
to favour the unequal distribution of its goods. Let me now argue for each point in turn.
To see why the ‘good for’ interpretation presses us toward equality, we must first 
remind ourselves that persons themselves are widely (and plausibly) viewed as moral 
equals, and that this is widely thought to imply that the interests of each are of equal im-
portance. There is, of course, a difference between the claim that each person’s interests 
are equally important and the claim that it is good that people have equal amounts of 
what is in their interest: an act-utilitarian would accept the first claim but perhaps not the 
second. However, given the affinities between the two claims, it may well be possible to 
bridge this gap. Also, even if we think the gap cannot be bridged, we may want to say, 
with Larry Temkin, that the claim that it is better that benefits be distributed equally than 
unequally if all else is equal is simply a ground-level normative truth (2003). On one or 
the other basis, we may be willing to accept the inference from the premise that (say) 
excellence and virtue are in each person’s interest to the conclusion that it is best that 
they be distributed as equally as possible. It is, I think, precisely the attractiveness of this 
inference that makes it tempting to take the ‘good for’ interpretation of perfectionism to 
support the axiological version of the view that perfectionist goods should be distributed 
equally.
There is also a line of reasoning that leads from the ‘good for’ interpretation to the 
deontological version of the egalitarian thesis. To bring this out, we need only note that 
— 592 —
 Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 3
ethIcal perspectIves – september 2012
the claim that persons are moral equals implies not only that each person’s interests are 
equally important, but also that governments must attach equal weight to each person’s 
interests when deciding how to act. Of course, here again there is a gap, this time be-
tween the claim that a government must attach equal weight to each citizen’s interests 
and the claim that it must promote the equal satisfaction of those interests. Once again, 
however, it may be possible to bridge the gap, this time by showing that the former ob-
ligation yields a suitably hedged version of the latter. If this can be done, then we will be 
able to infer, from the premise that excellence and virtue are in each person’s interest, 
that governments are at least pro tanto obliged to promote their equal distribution. And 
I think it is precisely the attractiveness of this line of reasoning that makes it tempting to 
take the ‘good for’ interpretation of perfectionism to support the deontological version of 
the egalitarian thesis.
But both temptations vanish when we switch to the ‘good simpliciter’ interpretation; 
for the unequal distribution of what is good simpliciter is definitely not ruled out by the 
moral equality of persons. The key fact here is that claims about what is good simpliciter, 
which make no mention of anyone’s interests, are for that reason incapable of meshing 
with any kind of demand for the equal satisfaction of interests. This means that there is no 
obvious route from the premise that something is good simpliciter to the conclusion that 
it should be distributed equally among persons. Even if the things that are good simpliciter 
consist exclusively of states that only persons can entertain – even if, for example, the 
relevant goods are knowledge, excellence, and virtue – those who have less of these 
goods than others will be neither disadvantaged nor the victims of injustice. Although 
there is indeed a respect in which these individuals will be worse than others, they will not 
thereby be worse off. And, for this reason, the unequal distribution of knowledge or excel-
lence or virtue will on this account have no more normative significance than (say) the 
unequal height of different trees in a forest.
So far, I have argued only that we do not have reason to favour the equal distribution 
of things that are good simpliciter, but not that we do have reason to favour the unequal 
distribution of these or any related goods. There is, however, a simple additional argu-
ment that sometimes does provide us with reasons of the latter sort. This argument’s 
premises are, first, that it is always better that the world contain more than less goodness 
simpliciter (henceforth, for brevity, just ‘value’), and second, that maximizing it sometimes 
requires distributing goods unequally. Although the argument’s first premise approaches 
self-evidence, the truth of the second depends on a number of factors that I can only 
gesture at briefly here.
To bring out what is at issue, it will be helpful to begin with a radically simpli-
fied version of perfectionism. Let us suppose therefore that the only thing with value is 
knowledge and each increment in knowledge (somehow measured) has the same value. 
Under these assumptions, the best state of the world will be one that contains the most 
knowledge, and the best way to produce the best state will be to deploy our resources in 
whichever ways maximize knowledge. As Thomas Hurka points out, this will mean de-
voting the same amount of money to the education of each as long as certain conditions 
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are met, among them the conditions that (i) each person is equally able to learn and (ii) 
each dollar spent educating a less- educated person produces more knowledge than one 
spent educating someone more educated.2 But whatever we say about the second condi-
tion – and I am not sure what to say about it – the first condition is clearly not met. It is 
manifestly false that everyone is equally able to learn, and so it is also false that we can 
maximize value by distributing our educational resources equally. This is not to say that 
we can maximize value by distributing knowledge itself unequally – given the assumptions 
under which we are operating, any given amount of it will have the same value no mat-
ter how it is distributed – but it does mean that we can maximize value by opting for an 
unequal distribution of educational resources, which in its turn will cause knowledge to 
be distributed even more unequally than it otherwise would be. 
This example shows that those who accept the ‘good simpliciter’ interpretation of 
perfectionism can have reason to distribute goods unequally, but it sheds little light on 
whether they often or ever actually do. This, of course, is where things get tricky. Here, 
very briefly, are two complicating factors that pull us in opposite directions.
A fact which suggests that the ‘good simpliciter’ interpretation does not often give us 
reason to distribute goods equally is that many of the things that are put forth as valuable 
are far less dependent than knowledge on abilities that vary greatly among people. One 
common candidate is virtue, which many optimistically take to be within the reach of all, 
while another is the development of whatever talents one has, even if they are meagre. 
Along somewhat different lines, one might say, with Hurka, that although what matters 
is absolute excellence and not just doing as well as one can, a valuable level of excellence 
can be achieved in so many different domains – Hurka cites not only science and musical 
composition, but also craft work, sports, and personal relations – that just about every-
one is capable of being excellent at something.3 The thrust of these possibilities is clearly 
to minimize the force of the inegalitarian argument.
But there is another consideration that may increase its force, and that is the pos-
sibility of perfectionist goods whose value is not a linear function of their quantity. 
Consider, for example, artworks. It does not seem implausible to suppose that there is 
much value in the existence of a brilliantly executed painting, but none at all in the exist-
ence of one that is clumsy and amateurish. Even on the false assumption that people are 
equal in artistic talent, the truth of this supposition would imply that it is foolish to try 
to maximize this form of value by providing art lessons for everyone. The obviously bet-
ter strategy is to concentrate on bringing some smaller number of individuals above the 
threshold at which their work begins to have perfectionist value by devoting all the avail-
able resources to them. Moreover, the logic of this case will not change if what is said to 
have the perfectionist value is not an outstanding painting itself, but rather the process of 
producing it or the possession of the skill to produce it; for as long as the value attaches 
only to what is outstanding in each category, the most efficient use of our resources to 
produce it will remain inegalitarian.
Because these issues are so tangled, the question of how much inequality the 
‘good simpliciter’ interpretation of perfectionism commits us to has no obvious answer. 
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However, what I think can be said with confidence is that when it is combined with 
many if not most substantive perfectionist theories, the ‘good simpliciter”’ interpretation 
will commit us to favouring inequality in at least some cases. And, as long as this is true, 
the implications of this interpretation will remain decisively different from those of its 
competitor.
Iv. Beyond neutrality revIsIted
I said in Beyond Neutrality that knowledge, achievement, close relationships, and a number 
of other traits and activities are inherently valuable, and that each owes its value to the 
fact that it either is, or is intimately related to, a goal that just about all normal humans 
are just about unable to avoid pursuing. I said, in addition, that this argument leaves 
unresolved the question of “whether it is best if a relatively small number of people are 
exceptionally knowledgeable and accomplished or if the general level of knowledge and 
excellence is higher but no one is outstanding” (1997, 243). However, against this last 
claim, two contributors to the current edition of Ethical Perspectives have suggested that 
the logic of my position pushes me in the direction of equality,4 and I now think they are 
probably right.
My reasons for agreeing are simple enough. Because the argument of Beyond 
Neutrality rests on premises about the underlying structure of human consciousness, its 
conclusions are naturally understood as claims about what is good for us in virtue of 
our having that form of consciousness. Given their deep and intimate connections to the 
psychology that creatures like us share, the goods of knowledge, excellence, sociality, and 
the rest are best understood as components of our flourishing. Thus, given my current 
conclusion that the ‘good-for’ version of perfectionism is congenial to distributive equal-
ity, the further conclusion that we have reason to promote the equal distribution of these 
goods follows straightway.
In Beyond Neutrality, I noted the possibility of adopting this ‘good-for’ interpretation, 
but suggested that even if we do, we will not be able to say that either governments or 
individuals have reason to promote such goods as knowledge and excellence unless we as-
sume that each person having what is good for them is, in its turn, good simpliciter. I still 
think that claim is true, but I also think that as long as each person having what is good 
for them is to the same degree good simpliciter – as, given the moral equality of persons, 
it seems to be – the claim’s truth will not conflict with the case for distributing what is 
good for people equally among them, but rather if anything will support it. In accepting 
that case, I take myself to be agreeing at least in part with Christoph Henning and just 
about completely with Christine Sypnowich.
For reasons of space, I must refrain from discussing many of the interesting points 
that Henning makes (although I cannot resist noting that I do not think the foundational-
ist structure of my perfectionist account of value is really in any tension with my coher-
entist approach to the account’s justification). However, what I can say in relation to our 
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current topic is that although I think Henning is right to view my version of perfection-
ism as congenial to equality, I also think there is some lack of clarity in his reasons for 
holding this view. The problem, in brief, is that his argument seems to vacillate between 
the ‘good for’ and the ‘good simpliciter’ versions of perfectionism. Both versions appear 
to be in play, for example, when he writes that
[p]erfectionism as a distributive principle only leads to radically unequal outcomes if 
we assume that individuals are different by nature (2012, ???).
and that
[i]f individuals do not differ greatly in their natural abilities, elaborating what is good 
for people in general does not hurt anybody; on the contrary, it will benefit everyone 
and by implication raise the general welfare (2012, ???).
In the first of the quoted sentences, Henning implies (though he does not quite say) that 
if people did differ radically in their ability to acquire perfectionist goods, then perfec-
tionism would indeed justify significant distributive inequality. Although he does not 
specify whether what we would then have reason to distribute unequally are resources 
or perfectionist goods themselves, the thought in either case seems to be that inequality 
would be justified because it would maximize overall perfection. However, as we have 
seen, the idea that perfection is something we have reason to maximize is most naturally 
linked to the idea that it is good simpliciter. It is therefore a bit surprising that in the second 
quoted sentence, Henning writes that if people have roughly similar levels of ability, then 
promoting the equal development of all benefits everyone and raises the general level of 
welfare; for these formulations clearly imply that the relevant value-notion is goodness 
for people.
Although the two halves of Henning’s argument do not fit cleanly together, there is 
some reason to suppose that the second half, which treats perfectionism as a view about 
human well-being, reflects his considered view. This, at any rate, is one conclusion that 
can be drawn from the fact that he goes on to speak of “ascrib[ing] equal respect to every 
individual, regardless of his or her peculiarities” (2012, ???) and cites with approval the 
claim that “[w]e are equal because we all are human, therefore we deserve equal condi-
tions” (2012, ???). If these claims reflect Henning’s considered view, then the gist of his 
position may be that the presumption in favour of distributing knowledge, achievement, 
and the rest equally rests on the facts that these things are good for individuals and that 
each individual’s interests count equally. If this interpretation is correct, then Henning’s 
position will, in the end, be very close to the one I am now inclined to favour.
And so, even more clearly, is that of Christine Sypnowich. In her essay, Sypnowich 
endorses a variant of this paper’s main thesis when she writes that that “crucial for any 
hope that perfectionism will yield an egalitarian position is that the account focus on 
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human well-being as opposed to achievement or excellence per se” (2012 ???). She also 
recognizes that my version of perfectionism, which grounds the value of knowledge, 
excellence, the relevant forms of sociality, and the rest in their connections to the satis-
faction of certain goals that just about all humans are just about unable to avoid seeking, 
yields an account of perfectionism that “is particularly person-centred” (2012 ???) and that 
seeks to specify “what is truly good for persons” (2012 ???). And from these premises 
(backed by some ancillary observations about my discussions of other topics), she draws 
what I take to be the correct conclusion that “Sher’s individualist conception of perfec-
tionism is thus certainly congenial to egalitarian concerns” (2012 ???). With all of this, 
I wholeheartedly concur. As might be expected, I think there is more to the substantive 
views that she attributes to old fogeys – I myself prefer the appellation ‘old crab’ – than 
she is willing to allow; but this is a quibble. I am very grateful for her accurate and gener-
ous discussion, as indeed I am for the other acute essays in this Reactions and Debate sec-
tion that I have not been able to discuss here. I have learned much about the implications 
of my own position – about its strengths as well as its weaknesses – from reading them.
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notes
1. G.E. Moore argues that the only intelligible value-notion is goodness simpliciter in chapter 
3 of his Principia Ethica (1959). Against Moore, Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that this notion is 
not intelligible, and that every use of ‘good’ can in the end be understood in terms of something 
like goodness-for (1997). 
2. For a discussion of these and other relevant conditions, see Thomas Hurka (1993) chap-
ters 12 and 13. 
3. See Hurka (1993) chapter 12. 
4. See Henning (2012, ???-???) and Sypnowich (2012, ???-???), both in the present edition. 
